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The Framers of the United States Constitution wrote Article I, Section 8 in 
order to address some daunting collective action problems facing the young na-
tion. They especially wanted to protect the states from military warfare by fo-
reigners and from commercial warfare against one another. The states acted in-
dividually when they needed to act collectively, and Congress lacked power 
under the Articles of Confederation to address these problems. Section 8 thus au-
thorized Congress to promote the “general Welfare” of the United States by tack-
ling many collective action problems that the states could not solve on their own.  
Subsequent interpretations of Section 8, both outside and inside the courts, 
often have focused on the presence or absence of collective action problems in-
volving multiple states—but not always. For example, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in trying to distinguish the “truly national” from the “truly local” 
in the context of the Commerce Clause, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
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617-18 (2000), has differentiated “economic” activity, which Congress may re-
gulate, from “noneconomic” activity, which Congress may not regulate.  
A federal constitution ideally gives the central and state governments the 
power to do what each does best. But economic activity does not generally cause 
collective action problems among the states, and noneconomic activity is not 
generally free from collective action problems. Consequently, Congress is not 
generally better at regulating economic activity, and the states are not generally 
better at regulating noneconomic activity. The distinction between economic and 
noneconomic activity seems mostly irrelevant to the problems of federalism. 
We propose a better foundation for American federalism in Section 8. Our 
theory distinguishes activities that pose collective action problems from those that 
do not. This approach flows directly from the relative advantages of the federal 
government and the states. We show that Section 8 mostly concerns collective ac-
tion problems created by interstate externalities and national markets. We con-
clude that Section 8 authorizes Congress to tax, spend, and regulate to solve 
these collective action problems.  
Collective action federalism finds that the limits and expanse of congres-
sional power in Section 8 turn on the difference between individual and collective 
action by the states. The theory uses this distinction to differentiate interstate 
commerce from intrastate commerce, not the economic/noneconomic distinc-
tion. Our distinction best explains why Congress may not ordinarily use its com-
merce power to regulate such crimes as assault or gun possession in 
schools. Collective action federalism also identifies a constitutional “hook” for 
Congress to regulate multi-state problems of collective action that may not in-
volve commerce: Clause 1 of Section 8 authorizes some forms of regulation of 
noneconomic harms that spill over state boundaries, such as contagious diseases 
and certain kinds of environmental pollution.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal system was created with the intention of combining the different 
advantages which result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations . . . .1 
  
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked the power to protect 
the states from military warfare waged by foreigners and from commercial war-
fare waged by one another. The states proved unable to solve these difficulties 
on their own. They acted individually when they needed to act collectively, and 
the Framers of the United States Constitution concluded that the states cannot 
reliably achieve an end when doing so requires two or more of them to coope-
rate. The solution lay with the establishment of a more comprehensive unit of 
government—a national government with the authority to tax, raise and support 
a military, regulate interstate and international commerce, and act directly on 
individuals. The Constitutional Convention thus instructed the midsummer 
Committee of Detail that Congress would possess the power “to legislate in all 
Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which 
the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United 
States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.”2 The 
Committee subsequently produced Article I, Section 8.  
The Framers lacked the tools and language of modern social science, but 
they knew a collective action problem when they saw it. When activities spilled 
over from one state to another, the Framers recognized that the actions of indi-
vidually rational states produced irrational results for the nation as a whole—
the definition of a collective action problem. The federal government is the 
smallest unit that internalizes these spillovers. By internalizing the effects, the 
federal government is more likely than the states to solve the problem of inter-
state spillovers. So Article I, Section 8 of the new Constitution gave Congress 
additional powers to address collective action problems. 
Interpretations of Article I, Section 8 since the Founding have not always 
focused on collective action problems involving multiple states. Regardless of 
collective action problems, many presidents and members of Congress 
 
 1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 206 (Francis Bowen ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., Cambridge, Sever & Francis 1862). 
 2. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131-32 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
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throughout the nineteenth century doubted the constitutionality of internal im-
provements and disaster relief by the federal government.3 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court of the United States, in trying to distinguish the “truly national” 
from the “truly local” in the context of the Commerce Clause,4 historically has 
gone back and forth between imposing essentially no limits on the scope of the 
commerce power and imposing a series of dubious formal distinctions. The cri-
sis of the Great Depression ultimately exploded the Lochner Court’s categorical 
differentiations between “manufacturing” and “commerce,” “direct” and “indi-
rect” effects on commerce, goods in the “flow” of commerce and goods not in 
the flow, and “harmful” and “harmless” goods in commerce.5 More recently, 
the Court has distinguished “economic” or “commercial” activity, which Con-
gress may regulate using its commerce power, from “noneconomic” or “non-
commercial” activity, which Congress may not regulate.  
A federal constitution ideally gives the central and state governments the 
power to do what each does best. Economic activity, however, does not gener-
ally cause collective action problems among the states, and noneconomic activ-
ity is not generally free from collective action problems. Consequently, Con-
gress is not generally better at regulating economic activity, and the states are 
not generally better at regulating noneconomic activity. Whatever its usefulness 
in defining the word “Commerce,”6 the distinction between economic and non-
economic activity is mostly irrelevant to the problems of federalism. 
We propose a more promising constitutional foundation for American fe-
deralism in Article I, Section 8. Our theory of collective action federalism 
flows directly from the relative advantages of the federal government and the 
states: much of what the federal government does best is to solve collective ac-
tion problems that the states cannot solve on their own.7 We will argue that the 
 
 3. See infra Part I.A.2.  
 4. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000). The Commerce Clause is 
Clause 3 of Article I, Section 8. The Court has, at times, also imposed federalism-based lim-
its on the General Welfare Clause, which is Clause 1 of Article I, Section 8. 
 5. See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 447-49 (5th ed. 2006). 
 6. For a discussion of competing views of the meaning of the word “Commerce” in 
Clause 3, see infra notes 177, 242, and accompanying text, contrasting the modern Court’s 
“economic” conception with the broader, social conception of Akhil Amar and Jack Balkin.  
 7. As Donald Regan has written about the Commerce Clause in particular, “when we 
are trying to decide whether some federal law or program can be justified under the com-
merce power, we should ask ourselves the question, ‘Is there some reason the federal gov-
ernment must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot leave the matter to the states?’” 
Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Re-
write United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 555 (1995). Regan’s approach to the 
commerce power shares some important similarities with ours, although he does not purport 
to offer an integrated theoretical account of Article I, Section 8 as a whole. See also Ann 
Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 817 
(1996) (“We should begin a reconstruction of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that looks 
deeply into why it is good for some matters to be governed by a uniform federal standard, 
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eighteen clauses of Section 8 are a coherent set, not a heterogeneous aggrega-
tion of unrelated powers. Coherence comes from the connection the specific 
powers have to collective action problems affecting the general welfare.  
Section 8 begins in Clause 1 by granting Congress the power to “lay and 
collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of 
the United States.” Welfare is “general” (or “among the several States,” in the 
language of Clause 3) when the federal government can obtain it and the sepa-
rate states cannot—that is, when spillovers pose a collective action problem for 
the states. The theory of collective action federalism interprets the clauses of 
Section 8 as authorizing Congress to tax, spend, and regulate when two or more 
states face collective action problems. Conversely, governmental activities that 
do not pose collective action problems for the states are “internal to a state” or 
“local.”  
Some concepts from economics help to develop the theory of collective ac-
tion federalism. We will show that the eighteen clauses of Article I, Section 8 
mostly address two kinds of spillovers: interstate externalities and national 
markets. 
Conscientious members of Congress and presidents should use the theory 
of collective action federalism in assessing the scope of their own legislative or 
veto powers. Courts also should use the theory to the extent that they engage in 
judicial review of federalism questions. The theory of collective action federal-
ism addresses the constitutional meaning of Section 8, not the extent to which 
courts should declare its meaning in constitutional adjudication.  
Part I, on history, surveys past interpretations of Article I, Section 8, both 
outside and inside the courts. Part II, on theory, shows how interstate externali-
ties and markets cause collective action problems that affect the general wel-
fare. Part III, on taxonomy, sorts the powers in Article I, Section 8 into analyti-
cal categories from economics, notably interstate externalities and national 
markets. Taken together, Parts I through III demonstrate that the specific pow-
ers form a coherent group, one that defines a substantive constitutional concep-
tion of the “general Welfare.”  
Part IV identifies substantial support for the theory of collective action fe-
deralism in the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article I, Section 8 dur-
ing the tenure of Chief Justice John Marshall and since 1937. We also identify 
two ways in which existing constitutional understandings of Congress and the 
Court would improve by taking greater account of the existence or nonexis-
tence of collective problems involving multiple states. First, collective action 
federalism differentiates interstate commerce from intrastate commerce by us-
 
why it is good for some things to remain under the control of the various states, and what 
effect these choices will have on the federal courts.”). See generally Steven G. Calabresi, “A 
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 752, 781-84 (1995) (stressing the importance of federalism, including the 
problem of positive and negative externalities in the absence of a national government). 
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ing the distinction between individual and collective action by the states, not 
the Supreme Court’s distinction between “economic” and “noneconomic” ac-
tivity. The distinction between individual and collective action by the states 
best explains why Congress may not ordinarily use the Commerce Clause to 
regulate such crimes as assault or gun possession in schools. Indeed, our dis-
tinction explains what the Court has actually done in recent Commerce Clause 
cases better than the Court’s own proffered distinction.8 
Second, collective action federalism suggests that Congress possesses 
some power under Clause 1 to regulate noncommercial harms that spill over 
state boundaries, such as certain environmental problems and contagious dis-
eases. We thus favor reconsideration of the Court’s conclusion in United States 
v. Butler that the General Welfare Clause does not confer any regulatory au-
thority.9 Not only can the text of Clause 1 bear such an interpretation, but we 
also avoid longstanding concerns about a general federal police power and 
about rendering the rest of Section 8 superfluous. We avoid these concerns by 
defining the “general Welfare” substantively based on the nature of the prob-
lems addressed by the balance of Section 8. 
Part V identifies one way of evaluating congressional judgments about the 
existence and seriousness of collective action problems, and about the adequa-
cy of Congress’s response. The Conclusion summarizes the argument. 
I. PAST INTERPRETATIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 
We begin with previous interpretations of Article I, Section 8, both extra-
judicial and judicial, over the course of American history. Although we will not 
rest our interpretation of Section 8 primarily on history, much of this history 
supports our structural and consequentialist approach.10 Moreover, the parts of 
the history that do not support our approach illustrate the problems that result 
when constitutional interpretation of Section 8 disregards collective action 
problems and attempts instead to resolve federalism questions by using one or 
another variety of formal distinctions. 
 
 8. This Article’s approach to the Commerce Clause remarkably resembles an impor-
tant paper by Jack Balkin that we recently discovered. See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010). Whereas Balkin is especially concerned with the original public 
meaning of the Commerce Clause, we are especially concerned with the analysis of collec-
tive action problems in Article I, Section 8 as a whole and their connection to the general 
welfare. Notwithstanding those differences in emphasis, Balkin and we entirely agree that 
collective action problems are the key to understanding the scope of the commerce power, 
and that this insight is evident in the structure of the Constitution, in the historical discus-
sions that led to its drafting and ratification, in much judicial precedent, and in a sound con-
sequentialist analysis of the optimal division of authority in a federal system.  
 9. 297 U.S. 1, 64-66 (1936). For a discussion of Butler, see infra Part I.B.1.  
 10. For a discussion of the standard approaches to constitutional interpretation, see in-
fra Part III.D. 
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A. Section 8 Outside the Courts 
1. Preratification 
The structure of governance established by the Articles of Confederation 
often prevented the states from acting collectively to pursue their common in-
terests.11 Solving these problems of collective action was a central reason for 
calling the Constitutional Convention.12 These facts bear on the proper inter-
pretation of the constitution that emerged from the Convention, as we will 
show by beginning with the general welfare.  
Like the constitution that would replace it, the Articles of Confederation 
used the phrase “general welfare” to describe problems that a central govern-
ment can solve better than the states. A particular understanding of this prob-
lem resulted in the Articles’ assignment of taxing and spending powers: Con-
gress was permitted to apportion taxes, but levying and collection was left to 
state governments.13 The Articles thus required the national government to 
finance itself by requisitioning the states. State governments, however, failed to 
honor the requisition orders, which deprived the federal government of the re-
sources it needed to protect the states both from external attack and from inter-
nal restraints on trade. The young nation subsequently experienced the failures 
of the Articles of Confederation, which changed many people’s understanding 
of the problem of the general welfare and convinced them that the central gov-
ernment needed additional powers. As a result, the Framers retained the same 
phrase—the “general Welfare”—in the Constitution, but they enumerated many 
specific powers of Congress denied in the Articles. For example, to solve the 
problem of financing the national government, the General Welfare Clause in 
the Constitution empowers Congress to levy taxes.14  
 
 11. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 24-28, 47-48, 102-08, 167-68, 188-89 (1996) (discussing var-
ious failures of the Articles of Confederation). Almost all of the first thirty-six essays in The 
Federalist are devoted to the various inadequacies of the Articles. 
 12. For a nice summary, see Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 611, 616-23 (1999). 
 13. The relevant language in the Articles read as follows: 
 All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense 
or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be de-
frayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion 
to the value of all land within each State, granted or surveyed for any person, as such land 
and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as 
the United States in Congress assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint. 
 The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction 
of the legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in 
Congress assembled. 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VIII. 
 14. Akhil Amar explains: 
Along with other federal organs, the navy could be directly financed by new federal imposts, 
duties, and other taxes imposed on individuals from every region—individuals who would be 
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Illuminating in this regard is James Madison’s Vices of the Political System 
of the United States,15 a memorandum he wrote while preparing for the Consti-
tutional Convention.16 Madison recorded various problems with the Articles of 
Confederation, including the failure of states to comply with congressional re-
quisitions, encroachments by states on federal power, state violations of the law 
of nations and treaties, state violations of the rights of other states, lack of con-
cert despite common interests, lack of federal protection of the states against 
internal violence, and lack of coercive power.17 Particularly revealing is Madi-
son’s concern about “want of concert in matters where common interest re-
quires it,” a “defect . . . strongly illustrated in the state of our commercial af-
fairs. How much has the national dignity, interest, and revenue suffered from 
this cause?”18 Madison further decried “the want of uniformity in the laws con-
cerning naturalization & literary property; of provision for national seminaries, 
for grants of incorporation for national purposes, for canals and other works of 
general utility, [which] may at present be defeated by the perverseness of par-
ticular States whose concurrence is necessary.”19 The problems of collective 
action confronting America in 1787 “necessitated a government with many 
more powers than were possessed by Congress under the Articles—including 
 
directly represented in the Congress that would set general tax rates and approve the overall 
defense budget. This new and readily enforceable revenue system would cure the collective-
action problems that had doomed the Articles’ requisition regime, which lacked strong me-
chanisms to sanction shirking states. (State self-interest alone had failed to guarantee ade-
quate financial support; continental defense was a classic shared good whose benefits ra-
diated beyond the contributing states.) 
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 46 (2005). 
 15. JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in JAMES 
MADISON: WRITINGS 69, 78-79 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
 16. See RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 46. 
 17. MADISON, supra note 15, at 69-73. Madison also listed the failure of the people to 
ratify the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 73-74. He further urged that “[i]n developing the 
evils which viciate the political system of the U.S. it is proper to include those which are 
found within the States individually, as well as those which directly affect the States collec-
tively, since the former class have an indirect influence on the general malady and must not 
be overlooked in forming a compleat remedy.” Id. at 74. Focusing on the “multiplicity,” 
“mutability,” and “injustice” of state laws, id. at 74-75, Madison then articulated a version of 
what would later become known as his theory of the extended republic, id. at 76-80. Histori-
cal scholarship has shown that the Framers were most concerned about the various collective 
action problems confronting the states, not about the problems internal to the states that 
preoccupied Madison. See AMAR, supra note 14, at 44 (“The central argument for a dramati-
cally different and more perfect union was not that it would protect Virginians from the Vir-
ginia legislature [as Madison insisted], but rather that it would protect Virginia from foreign 
nations and sister states, and in turn protect these sisters from Virginia.”). See generally 
Kramer, supra note 12, at 637-71 (developing this point in the context of arguing that the 
other Framers did not understand Madison’s theory of the extended republic). 
 18. MADISON, supra note 15, at 71.  
 19. Id.; see also Kramer, supra note 12, at 619 (“Federal authority to act independently 
of the states was also called for in other areas deemed properly subject to federal supervision 
by virtue of their interstate aspects, such as bankruptcy, intellectual property, and immigra-
tion and naturalization.”). 
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the great powers to tax, to raise and support armies, and to regulate com-
merce.”20 Facing these problems also “necessitated conferring authority to ex-
ercise these powers by acting directly on individual citizens.”21 
The proceedings of the Philadelphia Convention confirm that, in thinking 
through the scope of congressional power that would eventually become Article 
I, Section 8, the delegates focused on collective action problems involving mul-
tiple states.22 Specifically, the Convention instructed the midsummer Commit-
tee of Detail that Congress would be authorized “to legislate in all Cases for the 
general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are 
separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be 
interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.”23 This language registers 
the need to overcome a series of collective action problems facing the states. It 
was offered by Gunning Bedford of Delaware on July 17, 1787, in order to cla-
rify the sixth resolution of the Virginia Plan,24 so named because it was drafted 
by the Virginia delegation before the Convention was ready to proceed.25 Not-
ably, when the Committee of Detail made its report ten days later, “[i]t had 
changed the indefinite language of Resolution VI into an enumeration of the 
powers of Congress closely resembling Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
as it was finally adopted.”26  
This “radical change” wrought by the Committee of Detail was uncontro-
versial among the delegates; the Convention “accepted without discussion the 
enumeration of powers made by a committee which had been directed . . . that 
the Federal Government was ‘to legislate in all cases for the general interests of 
the Union . . . and in those to which the states are separately incompetent.’”27 
The delegates apparently perceived the connection between the general propo-
 
 20. Kramer, supra note 12, at 619. 
 21. Id. at 619-20. 
 22. As Akhil Amar explains, “Federal power over genuinely interstate and internation-
al affairs lay at the heart of the plan approved by the Philadelphia delegates.” AMAR, supra 
note 14, at 108 n.*.  
 23. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 131-32.  
 24. It is not clear how each part of the quoted language fits with the other parts. We 
perceive redundancy, as did Bedford. Regan explains that “[t]he Framers themselves were 
unclear about the precise reach and interrelations of the various clauses.” Regan, supra note 
7, at 570 n.70.  
 25. See RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 59. The Virginia Plan incorporated most of James 
Madison’s pre-Convention assessment of what ailed America. It formed the basis of the 
Convention’s first two weeks of debate. Id. 
 26. Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47 
HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1934).  
 27. Id. Rakove concludes from the fact that the Committee of Detail went unchal-
lenged on this matter that it “was only complying with the general expectations of the Con-
vention.” RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 178. According to Rakove, the Committee was attempt-
ing “to identify particular areas of governance where there were ‘general Interests of the 
Union,’ where the states were ‘separately incompetent,’ or where state legislation could dis-
rupt the national ‘Harmony.’” Id. 
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sitions in Resolution VI and the specific powers conferred in Article I, Section 
8. “If the Convention had thought that the committee’s enumeration was a de-
parture from the general standard for the division of powers to which it had 
thrice agreed, there can be little doubt that the subject would have been tho-
roughly debated on the Convention floor.”28 This history suggests that Section 
8 is appropriately read as a coherent response to a series of collective action 
problems. It suggests that Section 8 should be read as a unified whole, not as a 
list of unrelated powers.29 
During the ratification battle, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, an influential 
Framer and future Supreme Court Justice, seemed to understand Section 8 in a 
similar manner. In defending the proposed Constitution, the nationalist Wilson 
insisted that  
[w]hatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects, with-
in the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the 
government of that state; whatever object of government extends, in its opera-
tion or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as 
belonging to the United States.30 
Rather than considering Section 8 piecemeal, he generalized in much the same 
way that the Convention generalized in instructing the Committee of Detail on 
how to write Section 8. Wilson seemed to read Section 8 as a unified whole 
aimed at collective action problems involving more than one state.31  
 
 28. Stern, supra note 26, at 1340; see also Regan, supra note 7, at 556 (“[T]here is no 
reason to think the Committee of Detail was rejecting the spirit of the Resolution when they 
replaced it with an enumeration.”). 
 29. Stern analogized a dysfunctional economy to an ailing human body in order to un-
derscore the magnitude of the collective action problem facing the states during the Great 
Depression: 
 In the human organism the unity of the system which makes it impossible to treat any part 
of the body as entirely separate from the rest also makes it possible to treat and cure the body 
as a whole. Does the commerce clause, which is the integrating factor in the union of states, 
likewise permit the economic treatment of the union as a whole—or, by merely devitalizing 
the separate units without substituting any positive central authority, has it become the agen-
cy which will bring about their ruin? 
Stern, supra note 26, at 1336-37. Needless to say, Stern was asking a rhetorical question: 
“The Court can avoid the possibility of placing the nation in a defenseless position . . . by 
allowing federal control of those business transactions which occur in and concern more 
states than one and which the individual states are separately incompetent to control.” Id. at 
1366. He even noted the inclusion of the “general welfare” language in the Preamble and 
Clause 1 of Article I, Section 8, arguing that this placement demonstrated the view of the 
Convention “that the Constitution would serve and should be construed ‘to promote the gen-
eral welfare’ and not to perpetuate a union of states powerless when power is needed most.” 
Id. at 1342. Stern intuitively grasped some of the key economic concepts that we use 
throughout this Article. 
 30. BREST ET AL., supra note 5, at 556. Note, however, that there is an important dif-
ference between effects and external effects. Wilson’s language arguably was not as precise 
as it should have been. 
 31. Chief Justice John Marshall would later reason similarly to Wilson. See Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The genius and character of the whole govern-
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2. Postratification 
If key Framers were acutely mindful of collective action problems facing 
the states, the need for collective action often seemed lost on constitutional in-
terpreters during the Constitution’s first full century. After the Constitution was 
ratified, national politicians continued to debate the scope of federal power in 
Section 8, particularly the meaning of the reference in Clause 1 to the “general 
Welfare.” Because Congress seldom used its commerce power before the latter 
decades of the nineteenth century,32 and because presidential vetoes often pre-
vented the constitutionality of spending bills from being litigated in court,33 the 
main participants in these debates tended to be presidents and members of 
Congress. Unfortunately for the young nation, many of these participants did 
not seem particularly interested in inquiring whether Congress or the states 
were better situated to address the problem at hand. 
A major antebellum constitutional controversy concerned the extent to 
which the General Welfare Clause authorized Congress to spend money on “in-
ternal improvements.” Members of the Federalist Party, who were heavily in-
fluenced by Alexander Hamilton, defended robust congressional power under 
Clause 1 to spend for the “general Welfare” regardless of whether the expendi-
ture could plausibly be viewed as carrying out another enumerated power in 
Section 8.34 Federalists were opposed by Democratic Republicans such as 
James Madison, who argued that Congress possessed no independent power to 
tax and spend in pursuit of the general welfare. Rather, Madison insisted that 
the constitutional meaning of the phrase “general Welfare” is defined and li-
mited by the specific grants of authority in Clauses 2 through 17 of Section 8.35  
It was on this constitutional ground that President Madison, in 1817, rested 
his veto of then-Representative John C. Calhoun’s Bonus Bill, which would 
have funded internal improvements, including roads and canals. Calhoun be-
lieved that it would advance the “general welfare” of the nation as a whole “to 
perfect the communication from Maine to Louisiana,” “to connect all the great 
commercial points on the Atlantic . . . with the Western States,” and “to perfect 
 
ment seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and 
to those internal concerns which affect the States generally . . . .”). 
 32. BREST ET AL., supra note 5, at 176. 
 33. Id. at 450.  
 34. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURES (1791), 
reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230, 302-04 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 
1966) (arguing that the General Welfare Clause confers independent authority to tax and 
spend).  
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936) (discussing Madison’s 
restrictive view of the General Welfare Clause and Hamilton’s expansive view); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (arguing that the General Welfare Clause confers au-
thority to tax and spend only for purposes indicated by the enumerated powers listed in Ar-
ticle I, Section 8). 
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the intercourse between the West and New Orleans.”36 Madison conceded the 
policy virtues of the proposal but vetoed it because he was “constrained by the 
insuperable difficulty I feel in reconciling the bill with the Constitution of the 
United States.”37 Likewise, Madison’s successor, President James Monroe, ve-
toed a similar internal improvements bill on constitutional grounds in 1822,38 
and President Jackson voiced constitutional objections in vetoing the Maysville 
Road Bill in 1830.39 Subsequent Democratic Presidents—specifically, Tyler, 
Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan—articulated increasingly narrow conceptions of 
congressional authority over internal improvements. “And thus on the eve of 
the Civil War,” David Currie writes, “Congress found itself unable even to re-
move obstructions to naturally navigable waters, which Andrew Jackson him-
self had conceded it not only could but ought to do.”40 
In the decades after the Civil War, the same constitutional qualms about 
federal spending extended to disaster relief. There was substantial political 
precedent for federal spending to help the victims of disasters.41 But people 
disagreed about whether such spending was for the “general Welfare” as re-
quired by the Constitution, rather than for the particular welfare of those who 
benefited from the expenditures. For example, some congressional supporters 
of federal funding to aid the victims of an Ohio River flood in 1884 argued in 
effect that necessity trumped the Constitution.42 Likewise, President Grover 
Cleveland signed certain disaster relief bills during his presidency, but in 1887 
he vetoed on constitutional grounds a bill that would have provided relief to 
drought victims in Texas.43 
B. Section 8 Inside the Courts 
1. The General Welfare Clause 
The Supreme Court did not weigh in on this longstanding political debate 
over the scope of the federal taxing and spending powers until 1936.44 In Unit-
 
 36. BREST ET AL., supra note 5, at 82.  
 37. Id. at 83. Madison continued: “[I]t does not appear that the power proposed to be 
exercised by the bill is among the enumerated powers, or that it falls by any just interpreta-
tion within the power to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution those or 
other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 84.  
 39. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS 
1829-1861, at 10-12 (2005).  
 40. Id. at 25. 
 41. BREST ET AL., supra note 5, at 451 (discussing Michelle Dauber Landis, The Sym-
pathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387, 403-06 (2005)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 452-53. 
 44. The Court upheld federal land and franchise grants for interstate railroads in 1888, 
but relied on the Commerce Clause in doing so. See California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 
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ed States v. Butler, the Court explicitly approved Hamilton’s robust view of the 
scope of the taxing and spending powers as “the correct one.”45 Accordingly, 
the Court held that Congress possesses broad authority to tax and spend for the 
general welfare, so long as Congress does not violate another constitutional 
provision. The Court reaffirmed this holding in subsequent cases. In Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the fed-
eral unemployment compensation system created by the Social Security Act 
(SSA).46 And in Helvering v. Davis, the Court sustained the constitutionality of 
the SSA’s old age pension program, which had been funded exclusively by 
federal taxes.47  
While the Butler Court approved broad congressional power to tax and 
spend according to its assessment of what the general welfare requires, the 
same Court rejected the possibility that the General Welfare Clause allows fed-
eral regulation in addition to taxation and spending. “The true construction [of 
the clause],” the Court wrote, “undoubtedly is that the only thing granted is the 
power to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation’s 
debts and making provision for the general welfare.”48 The Butler Court rea-
soned that a contrary conclusion would allow a general federal police power 
and render the rest of Section 8 superfluous: 
The view that the clause grants power to provide for the general welfare, inde-
pendently of the taxing power, has never been authoritatively accepted. Mr. 
Justice Story points out that if it were adopted “it is obvious that under color 
of the generality of the words, to ‘provide for the common defence and gener-
al welfare,’ the government of the United States is, in reality, a government of 
general and unlimited powers, notwithstanding the subsequent enumeration of 
specific powers.”49 
Madison reasoned in much the same fashion in vetoing Calhoun’s “internal im-
provements” bill.50 Neither seemed to consider the possibility that their con-
 
U.S. 1, 39-41 (1888). 
 45. 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).  
 46. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
 47. 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
 48. Butler, 297 U.S. at 64. 
 49. Id. (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 907 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1905) (1833)). 
 50. Madison wrote: 
 To refer the power in question to the clause “to provide for the common defense and gen-
eral welfare” would be contrary to the established and consistent rules of interpretation, as 
rendering the special and careful enumeration of powers which follow the clause nugatory 
and improper. Such a view of the Constitution would have the effect of giving to congress a 
general power of legislation instead of the defined and limited one hitherto understood to be-
long to them, the terms “common defense and general welfare” embracing every object and 
act within the purview of a legislative trust. It would have the effect of subjecting both the 
Constitution and laws of the several States in all cases not specifically exempted to be super-
seded by laws of Congress. 
BREST ET AL., supra note 5, at 83 (quoting James Madison, Veto Message (Mar. 3, 1817), in 
1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 584-85 
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cerns about a general federal police power were overstated—that the phrase 
“general Welfare” in the General Welfare Clause might possess substantive 
content that is illuminated by considering the nature of the problems addressed 
in the balance of Section 8. 
Instead, the Butler Court held unconstitutional the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933 (AAA), which sought to stabilize agricultural production and raise 
prices by offering farmers subsidies to limit their crops. The Court explained 
that the AAA “invades the reserved rights of the states” because its “purpose is 
the control of agricultural production, a purely local activity.”51 “It hardly 
seems necessary to reiterate,” Justice Owen Roberts wrote for the Court, “that 
ours is a dual form of government.”52 The Court was unmoved by “the fact 
that,” as one astute commentator noted contemporaneously, “no state ha[d] ever 
undertaken any serious exercise of such power, and . . . could not possibly 
make any such regulation effective.”53 
2. The Commerce Clause 
In contrast to judicial interpretation of the General Welfare Clause, the 
Court began construing the scope of Congress’s power “[t]o regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States”54 early in the nineteenth century. During 
that time period, the Court rarely but broadly interpreted the Commerce Clause. 
After generously construing the scope of congressional power in Section 8 as a 
whole in McCulloch v. Maryland,55 the Court expansively read the scope of the 
commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden.56  
The Gibbons Court held that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to 
 
(James Richardson ed., 1897)). 
 51. Butler, 297 U.S. at 63-64, 68. This part of the Butler Court’s holding is no longer 
good law. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 108-10, 113-24 (1941) (upholding the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of 
goods produced by employees paid less than the mandated minimum wage). 
 52. Butler, 297 U.S. at 63. 
 53. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 203 
(2009) (quoting Isidor Loeb, Constitutional Interpretation in a Transitional Period, 21 ST. 
LOUIS L. REV. 95, 105 (1936)). 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 55. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424, 436 (1819) (holding that Congress had Section 8 au-
thority to create the Second Bank of the United States and that the states were prohibited by 
the Constitution from taxing the Bank). Although Section 8 neither mentions a bank nor em-
powers Congress to charter corporations, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned for the Court that 
the Bank was an “appropriate” means for Congress to employ in carrying out several of its 
enumerated powers: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, 
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” Id. at 
421. 
 56. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-97 (1824).  
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regulate navigation. In reaching that conclusion, Chief Justice Marshall’s defi-
nition of the phrase “among the several States” in the Commerce Clause was 
expansive but not limitless. “The word ‘among,’” Marshall wrote, “means in-
termingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled with them. 
Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each 
State, but may be introduced into the interior.”57 Yet Marshall took care to note 
that “[c]omprehensive as the word ‘among’ is, it may very properly be re-
stricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . . . The com-
pletely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for 
the State itself.”58 Although Marshall’s language left a good many line-drawing 
problems unresolved, he did point the way toward a functional middle ground 
between very limited federal power on the one hand, and effectively limitless 
federal power on the other.  
Congress did not begin using its commerce power in earnest until the dec-
ades after the Civil War, in response to the rapid industrialization of the coun-
try. From the late 1800s until 1937, the Lochner Court, which was committed 
to a largely unregulated national economy, adopted a narrow view of the 
Commerce Clause, and invalidated many federal statutes as beyond the scope 
of the commerce power. Sometimes the Court struck down acts that regulated 
“manufacturing” and not “commerce.”59 Other times the Court concluded that 
the commerce at issue was not “among the several States” because the effect on 
interstate commerce was “indirect,” as opposed to “direct,”60 or because the 
goods at issue were not in the “flow” of commerce,61 or because the goods that 
Congress was attempting to regulate were “harmless,” as opposed to “harm-
ful.”62 In one of these decisions, the Court went out of its way to dismiss the 
 
 57. Id. at 194.  
 58. Id. at 194-95. 
 59. E.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1895) (holding that the 
Sherman Antitrust Act could not be used to thwart a monopoly in the sugar-refining industry 
because the commerce power did not authorize Congress to regulate manufacturing, which 
was antecedent to commerce); see also, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 
(1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 because federal regula-
tion of wages and hours concerned production, not commerce). 
 60. E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 523-25, 527-
28, 542-51 (1935) (invalidating the Federal Live Poultry Code for the New York City met-
ropolitan area, which regulated the sale of diseased chickens and which included wage, hour, 
and child labor provisions, based on an “indirect” relationship to interstate commerce). 
 61. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 305. Compare Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 
375, 398-99 (1905) (upholding application of the Sherman Act to price fixing by stockyard 
owners), with Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 543 (“So far as the poultry here in question is 
concerned, the flow in interstate commerce had ceased. The poultry had come to a perma-
nent rest within the state.”).  
 62. E.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268-72, 276-77 (1918) (invalidating a 
federal ban on the shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced by child labor, and 
distinguishing cases in which the Court upheld federal regulation on the ground that in those 
cases “the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful 
results,” whereas in the case at bar “[t]he goods shipped [were] of themselves harmless”).  
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“proposition, often advanced and as often discredited, that the power of the 
federal government inherently extends to purposes affecting the nation as a 
whole with which the states severally cannot deal or cannot adequately 
deal . . . .”63 
These formal distinctions proved difficult to apply consistently, nonarbitra-
rily, and (eventually) in a manner that was compatible with the widely per-
ceived necessity for action by the federal government during the Great Depres-
sion. All of these distinctions abruptly exited constitutional law beginning in 
1937, when Justice Roberts altered his view of the scope of the commerce 
power and became the fifth vote to uphold laws of the kind previously invali-
dated by the Court.64 Perhaps he responded to a very popular President who 
was pushing a “court packing” plan to overcome judicial invalidations of key 
components of his New Deal economic recovery programs.65 (Roosevelt regis-
tered quickly that “[i]f forty states go along with adequate legislation and eight 
do not . . . we get nowhere.”)66 Perhaps Roberts experienced a genuine change 
of heart.67 In any case, his “switch in time that saved nine” came to character-
ize this deferential era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.68 From 1937 until 
1995, the Court did not invalidate one federal law as beyond the scope of the 
commerce power.  
For example, in Wickard v. Filburn, the Court allowed Congress to use its 
commerce power to attempt to raise the price of wheat on the interstate mar-
ket.69 Specifically, the Court upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s wheat-
production quota as applied to a farmer who exceeded his quota but used the 
excess wheat exclusively for home consumption and livestock feeding. The 
Court reasoned that such home consumption constituted a substantial and vary-
ing percentage of national demand, and so had a significant effect on the 
price.70 The Court also reasoned that Congress might rationally fear that excess 
 
 63. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 291. 
 64. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 22-24, 34-43 (1937) 
(upholding federal regulation of labor relations in the steel industry).  
 65. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 3-8, 202, 214, 217-36 (describing the 
political fight over President Roosevelt’s plan); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN 
ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010) (detailing the controversy surrounding President 
Roosevelt’s plan). 
 66. FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 208 (quoting Letter from President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt to David Grey (June 17, 1935)). 
 67. For impressive use of a formal, statistical model to prove this point, see Daniel E. 
Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69 (2010).  
 68. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 247-49, 253-
58, 261 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial 
discrimination by places of public accommodation); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 
296-99, 301-05 (1964) (upholding Title II’s application to a midsized, family-owned restau-
rant); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 108-10, 113-24 (1941). 
 69. 317 U.S. 111, 114-16, 118-29 (1942). 
 70. Id. at 127-28 (“The effect of consumption of home-grown wheat on interstate 
commerce is due to the fact that it constitutes the most variable factor in the disappearance of 
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wheat would end up being sold on the interstate market.71 Wickard has long 
been considered controversial; many commentators have viewed it as an in-
stance in which Congress pushed the outer limits of its commerce power.  
Until the 1990s, conventional wisdom held that Congress could regulate 
essentially any activity under the Commerce Clause. In 1995, however, the Su-
preme Court started imposing some limits on the regulatory power of Congress. 
The Court’s holdings created a new jurisprudence of the Commerce Clause. As 
discussed below, the Court has ostensibly placed decisive emphasis on its de-
termination of whether the activity regulated by Congress is “economic” or 
“noneconomic” in nature, which also appears to determine whether that activity 
exists “among the several States” or instead is internal to one state.  
The new epoch began with a constitutional challenge to a component of the 
Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), which criminalized 
possession of a firearm within one thousand feet of a school zone.72 In United 
States v. Lopez, the Justices considered whether Congress had exceeded its 
commerce power in enacting this law.73 Writing for Justices O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the law 
was unconstitutional on the ground that the presence of a firearm near a school 
did not substantially affect interstate commerce. In supporting this conclusion, 
the Chief Justice stressed that the GFSZA “is a criminal statute that by its terms 
has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms.”74 He did not actually refute the gov-
 
the wheat crop. Consumption on the farm where grown appears to vary in an amount greater 
than 20 per cent of average production.”). 
 71. Id. at 128 (“[B]eing in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the market and, 
if induced by rising prices, tends to flow into the market and check price increases.”). The 
Court further reasoned that homegrown wheat, even if never marketed, “supplies a need of 
the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. 
Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.” Id. 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (2006) (defining a “school zone” as: “(A) in, or on the 
grounds of, a public, parochial, or private school; or (B) within a distance of 1,000 feet from 
the grounds of a public, parochial, or private school”); id. § 922(q)(2)(a) (making it a crime 
“for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or 
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone”), invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 73. 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist identified three types of activity 
that Congress may regulate using its commerce power:  
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Con-
gress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intras-
tate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. 
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).  
 74. Id. at 561. Rehnquist further observed that the law “contains no jurisdictional ele-
ment which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in ques-
tion affects interstate commerce.” Id. He also noted the absence of legislative findings on 
how firearm possession in school zones affects interstate commerce. Id. at 562-63. 
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ernment’s empirical assertion that guns near schools substantially affect inter-
state commerce in the aggregate.75 Instead, he changed the subject, “paus[ing] 
to consider the implications of the Government’s arguments,”76 which were es-
sentially that if Congress may regulate gun possession in schools, then Con-
gress may regulate anything. Specifically, Rehnquist rejected the government’s 
rationales because he could not “perceive [in them] any limitation on federal 
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where 
States historically have been sovereign.”77 The Court did not—because it could 
not—provide a functional test for distinguishing substantial from insubstantial 
effects on interstate commerce. In Lopez, the Court’s characterization of the re-
gulated activity as noncommercial appeared decisive.  
Likewise, Justice Kennedy, whose views are likely controlling for the time 
being, wrote in a concurring opinion that “here neither the actors nor their con-
duct has a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the 
statute has an evident commercial nexus.”78 While noting that “[i]n a sense any 
conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin 
or consequence,” he stressed that “we have not yet said the commerce power 
may reach so far.”79  
Five years later, the Court demonstrated that Lopez was not merely sym-
bolic. The Federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) authorized victims 
of gender-motivated violence to sue their assailants for money damages in fed-
eral court.80 United States v. Morrison concerned the constitutionality of this 
civil damages provision; the question presented was whether the damages re-
medy fell within the scope of congressional authority under either the Com-
merce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.81 Splitting 5-4 the 
same way as in Lopez, the Court invalidated the damages remedy as beyond 
federal power under both provisions. In analyzing the commerce power, Chief 
 
 75. More precisely, the Court considered whether Congress could have rationally con-
cluded that the presence of firearms near schools substantially affects interstate commerce:  
 The Government argues that possession of a firearm in a school zone may result in vio-
lent crime and that violent crime can be expected to affect the functioning of the national 
economy in two ways. First, the costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the me-
chanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population. Second, violent 
crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are per-
ceived to be unsafe. The Government also argues that the presence of guns in schools poses a 
substantial threat to the educational process by threatening the learning environment. A han-
dicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry. That, in turn, 
would have an adverse effect on the Nation’s economic well-being. 
Id. at 563-64 (citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 564-65. 
 77. Id. at 564.  
 78. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 79. Id. 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2006), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000). 
 81. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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Justice Rehnquist again emphasized for the Court that Congress was regulating 
noneconomic activity traditionally regulated by the states: “Gender-motivated 
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”82 
Rehnquist declined to impose “a categorical rule against aggregating the effects 
of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases,” but he nonetheless 
insisted that “thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce 
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in 
nature.”83  
The Court rejected the government’s submission that violence against 
women substantially affects interstate commerce, despite a voluminous legisla-
tive history documenting Congress’s judgment to that effect.84 According to 
the Chief Justice, “Congress’ findings are substantially weakened by the fact 
that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected 
as unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution’s enumeration of pow-
ers.”85 Specifically, such reasoning “seeks to follow the but-for causal chain 
from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has al-
ways been the prime object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated ef-
fect upon interstate commerce.”86 
The Chief Justice warned that the government’s reasoning, if accepted, 
“would allow Congress to regulate any [violent] crime as long as the nation-
wide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, 
production, transit, or consumption.”87 This rationale could “be applied equally 
as well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the ag-
gregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is 
undoubtedly significant.”88 Again, the Court did not actually refute the gov-
ernment’s empirical assertions. Instead, it denied “that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggre-
gate effect on interstate commerce.”89  
In Gonzales v. Raich,90 the Court clarified that the economic/noneconomic 
characterization attaches to the general class of activity at issue. The general 
class of activity must be economic in order to fall under the regulatory power 
 
 82. Id. at 613.  
 83. Id. The Chief Justice further wrote that, like the GFSZA in Lopez, VAWA “con-
tains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of 
Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.” Id. 
 84. Id. at 614 (“In contrast with the lack of congressional findings that we faced in Lo-
pez, § 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-
motivated violence has on victims and their families.”).  
 85. Id. at 615. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 615-16. 
 89. Id. at 617. 
 90. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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granted to Congress by Clause 3, but some particular instances within the class 
may be noneconomic. In other words, regulation may encompass activity that 
the Court deems noneconomic if Congress rationally concludes that it is an es-
sential part of a general class of activity that the Court deems economic. For 
example, production of marijuana or wheat generally is an economic activity 
and thus is regulable by Congress under its commerce power. But according to 
the Court, congressional regulation of this general activity also can cover mari-
juana or wheat grown and consumed at home, which may be noneconomic.91  
Raich arose when California created a medical exception to its marijuana 
laws and the administration of President George W. Bush sought to prohibit the 
practice, arguing that it was preempted by the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act (CSA).92 Faced with an as-applied constitutional challenge to the CSA as 
beyond the scope of the commerce power, the Court held 6-3 that the Com-
merce Clause allows Congress to prohibit the local cultivation and use of mari-
juana in compliance with state law authorizing such use.93 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Stevens relied upon Wickard v. Filburn,94 which he read as “es-
tablish[ing] that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 
‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to 
regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate 
market in that commodity.”95 Justice Stevens saw “striking” similarities be-
tween Raich and Wickard: Congress could have rationally concluded that leav-
ing home-consumed wheat or marijuana outside the federal regulatory scheme 
would affect interstate price and market conditions.96 
In these cases, the Court has sought to impose limits on the power of Con-
gress in order to preserve the separation of federal and state powers established 
by Clause 3’s grant of authority to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States.” The Court has purported to find this limit by restricting regulatory 
power under the Commerce Clause to “economic” or “commercial” activity, no 
doubt in part because of the reference to “Commerce” in Clause 3. To clarify 
what it regards as “economic activity,” the Court in Raich cited a dictionary de-
finition of “economics” as “the production, distribution, and consumption of 
commodities.”97 Under the Court’s jurisprudence, then, the economic/ noneco-
nomic determination appears dispositive because only economic activities may 
be aggregated for purposes of deciding whether the activity has substantial ef-
fects on interstate commerce, and essentially every activity Congress might 
want to regulate has substantial effects on interstate commerce in the aggregate. 
 
 91. Id. at 17-19. 
 92. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006). 
 93. Raich, 545 U.S. at 3-4, 6, 8-9. 
 94. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 95. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.  
 96. Id. at 18-19. 
 97. Id. at 25-26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 
(1966)). 
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Justice Souter understandably charged the Morrison Court with resuscitating 
the formalism of the Carter Coal Court in the service of different ends.98 
There is a basic problem with using formal distinctions to divide federal 
and state powers in Article I, Section 8: the main reason for separating powers 
is the relative advantages of the federal and state governments. Formal distinc-
tions that are unrelated to relative advantages will fail to advance the general 
welfare when applied to federalism problems. To clarify the mismatch, we turn 
now to the economic theory of the general welfare. Later, we will show that a 
substantive conception of the general welfare has informed many of the Court’s 
decisions construing the Commerce Clause or the General Welfare Clause, both 
during the tenure of Chief Justice Marshall and since 1937—sometimes despite 
what the Court has said in cases such as Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. We also 
will identify ways in which contemporary constitutional understandings would 
be improved by taking greater account of the distinction between individual 
and collective action by states. 
II. THEORY OF THE GENERAL WELFARE 
We will use modern economics to analyze problems in the Articles of Con-
federation and their amelioration by Article I, Section 8. We begin with con-
cepts that are familiar to economists and positive political theorists, but that 
constitutional lawyers and judges may comprehend imperfectly.  
A. Externalities 
Economists use the term “public goods” to refer to goods supplied by the 
state whose technical characteristics require financing by taxes instead of pric-
es. Two characteristics of public goods necessitate financing by taxes. First, 
pure public goods are nonrivalrous, meaning that one person’s enjoyment does 
not detract from another’s. Thus, the security from foreign invasion enjoyed by 
one citizen does not detract from the security enjoyed by another citizen. Simi-
larly, when pollution abatement improves air quality, one person who breathes 
better air does not detract from another person’s breathing it. In contrast, pri-
vate goods are rivalrous. The bite that I take out of a sandwich leaves one less 
bite for someone else, and the land where I build my house becomes unavaila-
ble for building by others. 
Besides being nonrivalrous, pure public goods are nonexcludable, which 
means that excluding individuals from enjoying the benefits generated by the 
goods is infeasible or uneconomical. For example, all residents of the United 
States during the Cold War enjoyed the benefits of deterring a Soviet missile 
 
 98. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 644 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Just 
as the old formalism had value in the service of an economic conception [i.e., laissez faire], 
the new one is useful in serving a conception of federalism.”). 
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attack, and no one could be excluded from enjoying these benefits. Likewise, 
when abatement improves local air quality, everyone in the locality enjoys 
breathing the improved air. Similarly, everyone enjoys free access to local 
streets because establishing tollbooths on them is impractical. In contrast, pri-
vate goods are excludable with help from the law. Thus, the owner and posses-
sor of a sandwich can prevent others from eating it, and the owner of land can 
prevent others from entering it.99  
When exclusion is infeasible or uneconomical, individuals have an incen-
tive to free ride by not paying for the benefits that they receive. When benefi-
ciaries do not pay, suppliers cannot earn a profit, and so the market undersup-
plies the good.100 A free market will undersupply national defense, clean air, 
local streets, and other public goods. The state can prevent free riding by col-
lecting taxes to finance public goods. Because taxes are compulsory, people 
who try to free ride break the law.  
We have been discussing public goods, which convey benefits to people 
regardless of whether they pay for them. In general, “externalities” refer to un-
priced benefits and costs. Public goods are positive externalities that the state 
produces intentionally. Similarly, a person who gets vaccinated benefits others 
by reducing their risk of exposure to contagious diseases, and an apiarist who 
keeps bees for honey also pollinates other peoples’ orchards. These are positive 
externalities that individuals incidentally convey to others without their paying 
for them. Similarly, pollution is a negative externality that individuals and 
firms incidentally convey to others without having to pay for it. Dirty air is the 
byproduct of burning fuel; congested streets are the byproduct of commuting 
by car; and depleted stocks of fish are the byproduct of overfishing. House-
holds and firms pursue private goods and dump pollution in the public domain.  
Some negative externalities affect only contiguous landowners, such as the 
tree that blocks the neighbor’s light or the smell from a neighbor’s barn. In law, 
many of these externalities are “private nuisances.” Other negative externalities 
affect many people, such as pollution in the Los Angeles basin. Externalities 
that affect many people are called “public externalities” because they have the 
 
 99. Using these two defining characteristics of public goods, Paul Samuelson provided 
a remarkably simple and powerful mathematical formulation of efficiency in demand and 
supply. Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 350 (1955); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expendi-
ture, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). Note that the two characteristics of public goods 
are distinct. An uncongested bridge is nonrivalrous, but a tollbooth could be used to exclude 
people. A congested road with many entrances is rivalrous, but it is difficult to exclude 
people from using it. 
 100. Technical characteristics of goods can cause markets to fail. The classic mathemat-
ical treatment is KENNETH J. ARROW & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS (1971). 
Market failure provides the conventional economic justification for state supply and regula-
tion of goods. Early examples of books that use the categories of market failure to organize 
and evaluate regulations are STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982), and 
CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977). 
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two characteristics of public goods: nonrivalry and nonexclusion.101  
Three propositions are analytically equivalent: (i) a free market will under-
supply public goods; (ii) a free market will undersupply positive externalities; 
and (iii) a free market will oversupply negative externalities. 
B. Internalization Principle 
By definition, a national public good or bad is nonrivalrous and nonex-
cludable at the national level. Military defense is the standard example. Instead 
of being national, however, many externalities are mostly local. A local public 
good or bad is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable at the local level. Thus, Central 
Park in Manhattan mostly benefits the people who live or work nearby, and 
congestion on the streets of San Francisco mostly harms local people who drive 
or walk on them. An air quality basin, a city park, and a congested local street 
are standard examples of local public goods and bads.  
All public goods and bads present a challenge for public policy. Econo-
mists have a simple prescription to meet this challenge. Compared to unaf-
fected people, the people affected by a policy have more reason to inform 
themselves about it and to influence it. Thus the affected people are more likely 
to cast informed votes, monitor politicians, impose taxes on themselves, and 
perform the acts of citizenship that make democracy work. Considerations of 
information and motivation imply a prescription for allocating political power 
in a federal system that we call the internalization principle: assign power to 
the smallest unit of government that internalizes the effects of its exercise.102  
To illustrate, the internalization principle suggests why the largest and fin-
est parks in the United States are almost entirely the work of the federal gov-
ernment. Assume that establishing a large park in the mountains would attract 
visitors from all over the nation. The national government, not state or local 
governments, represents all of the beneficiaries. If most financing must come 
from taxes and not entrance fees, financing the national park from a national 
tax puts the burden on the beneficiaries. Federal officials have better incentives 
than state or local officials to build a large park that would attract visitors na-
tionally. Responsibility for such parks should fall upon officials who have a na-
tional perspective, which is mostly what we observe in fact.  
Thus the internalization principle has this national application: when a pub-
lic good is purely national, or nearly so, the central government should provide 
it. In other words, the central government should raise revenues and use them 
 
101. The distinction between private and public externalities is fundamental to the eco-
nomic analysis of property law. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 
147-50 (5th ed. 2008).  
 102. For an early formulation of this general approach that influenced economists, see 
WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972). For a later summary of this approach, see 
Wallace E. Oates, Federalism and Government Finance, in MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 126 
(John M. Quigley & Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994). 
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to supply national public goods, either directly by government production or 
indirectly by purchasing the good from a nongovernment producer. Equivalent-
ly, when a negative externality is purely national, or nearly so, the central gov-
ernment should control it. In other words, the federal government should abate 
the harm directly through government activity or indirectly by regulating the 
activities that cause the harm.  
Conversely, assume that a city neighborhood needs a small park for local 
residents. In situating and scaling the park, local residents possess better infor-
mation than nonresidents. Local residents also have stronger incentives than 
nonresidents to monitor the officials responsible for creating and maintaining 
the park. Thus, local officials have better incentives than central officials for 
supplying local public goods. Moreover, a local public good can be financed by 
a local tax, which primarily hits the beneficiaries and misses nonbeneficiaries. 
These facts favor assigning power over city parks to local governments. Thus 
the internalization principle has this local application: when a public good or 
bad is purely local, or nearly so, local government should provide or control 
it.103 
The internalization principle applies simply and immediately when the ex-
tent of the public good or bad corresponds to a government’s jurisdiction. 
Many types of externalities, however, disrespect jurisdictional boundaries. Wa-
ter and air circulate in regions formed by natural contours such as rivers and 
mountains, not political boundaries. Consequently, pollution spills over from 
one government jurisdiction to another. Spillovers create an incentive for each 
government to free ride on pollution abatement by others. To avoid free riding 
by localities, the government with primary responsibility for abatement should 
encompass the natural region affected by the pollution. 
Sometimes special governments can be created to fit the boundaries of a 
natural region. The jurisdiction of a special government ideally extends as far 
as the effects of the public goods that it supplies or the externalities that it ab-
ates. A special district might provide clean water to several counties, or it might 
impose liability on local governments that pollute an air basin. Some jurisdic-
tions rely more heavily on special districts than others. For example, the legal 
framework in California makes forming special districts relatively easy, and the 
state contains more than five thousand special governments such as water dis-
tricts, school districts, park districts, and transportation districts.104  
We use the phrase “interstate externality” to refer to a good or bad that is 
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable at the interstate level. Interstate externalities 
exist when significant benefits or costs from activities in one state spill over to 
another state without being priced. In practice, the federal government may be 
the only authority able to solve the problem. To understand why, the next Sub-
part explains the political foundation of the internalization principle.  
 
 103. See OATES, supra note 102. 
104. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 107 (2000). 
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C. Federal Coase Theorem 
The internalization principle is grounded in the politics of federalism, 
which we will analyze abstractly. With interstate externalities, two or more 
states can gain by cooperating with one another. Economists have studied vari-
ous obstacles that either increase the time and effort needed for cooperation or 
block it completely. The obstacles include unclear rights, incomplete contracts, 
lack of credible commitments, asymmetrical information, distrust, holdouts, 
and high communication costs.  
 The strategies that people use to respond to such obstacles are often com-
plicated, and models of them in game theory often have indeterminate re-
sults.105 A remarkable simplification often gives determinacy: sweep all of the 
obstacles to cooperation into the encompassing term “transaction costs.”106 A 
famous proposition in law and economics, which helped Ronald Coase win the 
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, asserts that individuals bargain successfully 
unless transaction costs impede them.107 Applied to intergovernmental rela-
tions, this proposition implies that when transaction costs are low, bargaining 
among governments will correct any undersupply of public goods or oversup-
ply of public bads.108 For example, when state governments can bargain easily 
with one another, they will cooperate in supplying the optimal amount of na-
tional defense and pollution abatement. These considerations lead to a proposi-
tion that we call the Federal Coase Theorem: assuming zero transaction costs, 
the supply of public goods and the control of externalities are efficient regard-
less of the allocation of powers to different levels of government.  
The Federal Coase Theorem describes a condition—zero transaction 
costs—under which the allocation of powers to different levels of government 
makes no difference to the efficient supply of public goods. In reality, the allo-
cation of powers to different levels of government makes a big difference. The 
point of the Federal Coase Theorem is to isolate the cause of this difference, 
not to deny its existence. Following this lead, we compare the transaction costs 
of cooperation in centralized and decentralized states. We will explain why un-
 
105. For an overview of game theory, see DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME 
THEORY (1991). 
106. For a critique of transaction costs and the Coase Theorem in light of game theory, 
see Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). 
107. See, e.g., NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 97 (2005) (“[T]he costs of transacting impede the parties’ bargain.”); Cooter, 
supra note 106, at 14 (“The basic idea of [Coase’s] theorem is that the structure of the law 
which assigns property rights and liability does not matter so long as transaction costs are 
nil; bargaining will result in an efficient outcome no matter who bears the burden of liabili-
ty.”). 
108. Here is the equivalent proposition for the private sector: with zero transaction 
costs of bargaining, the supply of private goods is efficient regardless of the number of mar-
kets. The choice between markets and hierarchies matters to efficiency only because of 
transaction costs.  
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animity rule paralyzes organizations with many members and majority rule 
animates them.  
In a decentralized system, states can cooperate with each other by forming 
compacts. In principle, compacts among states can supply interstate public 
goods and suppress interstate externalities without intervention by the federal 
government. When states compact, each one is free to join or not to join. Form-
ing a state compact thus requires unanimity among the participating govern-
ments.109 In contrast, Congress does not require unanimity among the states to 
pass a federal law. Instead of unanimity, Congress follows a majoritarian 
process—enacting legislation requires a majority of votes in both houses of 
Congress and the President’s signature.110 Economies of scale and scope gen-
erally create positive externalities that impose collective action problems. Inter-
state infrastructure provides an example. Just think of what would happen if the 
states were responsible for the interstate highway system. North Carolina might 
plan a north-south highway in a different place from where South Carolina was 
planning a north-south highway. Coordinating their plans so that the roads meet 
in the same place involves a collective action problem. The federal government 
solved this problem and created a coherent interstate highway system that far 
surpassed prior accomplishments by the individual states. 
The same logic that applies to interstate externalities also applies to the le-
gal foundations for interstate markets. Thus, assume that an interstate market 
requires a highway (an “internal improvement”) to pass through five states ar-
ranged in a line: ABCDE. Building the road through compacts re-
quires all five states to agree. The road will benefit people in each of the five 
states, but each state may prefer to shift most of the construction costs onto the 
other states. The value of cooperation jumps from zero to a large number when 
the number of cooperators increases from four to five. Each state gains bargain-
ing power by holding out and being the last state to join the compact. 
To reiterate, the holdout problem makes the probability of cooperation fall 
with the number of actors who must cooperate. We can illustrate these facts by 
using hypothetical numbers for a federal system. Imagine that the probability of 
cooperation is roughly 90% when interstate externalities affect two states.111 
 
109. In the United States, compacts may require congressional approval. U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”). In Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 
519 (1893), the Court held that congressional approval is required only for compacts “tend-
ing to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere 
with the just supremacy of the United States.” The Court declined to revisit this holding in 
United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452, 460 (1978). 
110. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. For several reasons, it may be more accurate to de-
scribe Congress, especially the Senate, as operating under a supermajority rule than under a 
majority rule, but this fact does not change the analysis in the text. There is less of a differ-
ence between unanimity rule and supermajority rule than there is between unanimity rule 
and majority rule, but there is still a difference, and typically a significant one. 
111. We choose 90% as our illustrative number because legal claims settle out of court 
COOTER AND SIEGEL 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2010 12:57 PM 
December 2010] COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM 141 
The probability of cooperation approaches zero as the number of states that 
must unanimously agree exceeds, say, ten. So the probability is very small that 
all fifty states would join a compact for common defense, create a unified post 
office, protect intellectual property, abolish internal tariffs, or allow the free 
mobility of capital and labor. Because unanimity rule paralyzes groups with 
more than a few members,112 state compacts seem unpromising as means to 
solve interstate externalities and build interstate markets.  
Having explained why unanimity rule paralyzes organizations with many 
members, now we will explain why majority rule animates them. Majority rule 
creates competition to become the decisive member in a majority coalition. 
Consider an assembly of one hundred one members. A coalition of fifty-one 
constitutes a majority. To form a majority coalition, a minority coalition of fifty 
members must attract one additional member. Any one of fifty-one persons 
could join the coalition and make a majority. Belonging to the majority coali-
tion conveys power and advantages unavailable to the minority. Conversely, 
holding out risks exclusion from power and other advantages. Instead of hold-
ing out and risking exclusion, the fifty outsiders may stampede to join the ma-
jority coalition and share in the advantages of power.113  
Applying this logic to the example of a polluted lake, assume that five local 
governments form a council with the power to impose a pollution-abatement 
program on its members by majority vote. A coalition of three local govern-
ments can impose an abatement plan that makes the other two bear a dispropor-
tionate share of abatement costs. A minority coalition with two members must 
attract an additional member to create a majority coalition. All three players 
outside this coalition may rush to join in order to avoid bearing a disproportio-
nate share of abatement costs. In general, competition to become the decisive 
 
at least 90% of the time for most types of disputes. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Precedent 
Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 221 (1999) (“Even considering only cases actually docketed, 
approximately ninety percent settle . . . .”). The problem of settlement may be harder for 
states than for individuals because the state is a collective actor with competing interest 
groups. 
112. Unsurprisingly, the Framers provided that ratification by nine of the thirteen states 
would suffice to establish the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VII, even though unanimity was 
required to amend the Articles of Confederation, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, 
art. XIII.  
113. This logic explains why theorists predicted that majority coalitions will incorporate 
as many members as effective control requires, and no more. William Riker developed this 
argument through the concept of the minimum winning coalition. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, 
THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 255-56 (1962). This prediction, however, is not 
borne out by many real-world legislatures, including the U.S. Congress. See, e.g., KEITH 
KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 4, 6 (1998) (observing that 
one of the “basic facts of lawmaking” in modern America is that winning coalitions are al-
most always much greater than bare-majority sized). The instability of governing coalitions 
under majority rule, discussed in the following note, may help to explain the predictive fail-
ure of Riker’s theory. 
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member of the majority coalition often prevents holdouts in large organiza-
tions.114 
As an organization grows, it may switch from unanimity to majority rule in 
order to avoid paralysis. Thus, as more countries join the European Union, the 
Council of Ministers increasingly follows qualified majority rule rather than 
unanimity rule.115 Equivalently, a shift from unanimity rule to majority rule in-
creases the optimal number of governments in a federal system. A federal sys-
tem with majority rule can work effectively with more members than can a fed-
eral system with unanimity rule. Thus, as the European Union resolves more 
problems by majority rule and fewer problems by unanimity rule, it can ac-
commodate more members.  
Switching from unanimity rule to majority rule ameliorates the problem of 
holdouts, but it creates a new problem: minority exploitation. Under unanimity 
rule, anyone who stands to lose from collective action can veto it. The switch to 
majority rule removes this protection from the minority. If collective action 
creates more costs than benefits for the minority, then the minority suffers a net 
loss from federal action.116 For this reason, governments that fear being in the 
minority (rightly or wrongly) may resist the centralization of power, as do the 
smaller countries in the European Union,117 as did delegates from the smaller 
 
114. Note, however, that the same reason many people wish to join the majority coali-
tion explains why it may be unstable: anyone excluded from the majority coalition can offer 
to benefit all but one member of it by replacing one of its members on terms more favorable 
to the others. The technical name for this problem is the “empty core.” See Tracey E. George 
& Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., How Is Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1270 
n.21 (2002) (“A bargaining situation requiring a majority agreement contains an empty core 
when a participant may be persuaded to defect from an agreement by the offer of a bigger 
share and such defection changes the majority agreement.”); see also COOTER, supra note 
104, at 58-59 (discussing majority-rule division of a fixed sum of money).  
115. See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 124 (4th ed. 2008) (“Member States acknowledged that there had to be an exten-
sion of qualified-majority voting in an expanded Union. Unanimity would often be syn-
onymous with inaction, since one State out of twenty-seven would almost certainly object.”); 
HANS SLOMP, EUROPEAN POLITICS INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: INTEGRATION AND 
DIVISION 134 (2000) (“Since the late 1980s, . . . the rule of unanimity has been given up, ex-
cept for very important matters. In the Council of Ministers, a qualified majority now suffic-
es for most decisions.”). 
116. This is one reason why Buchanan and Tullock stressed the advantages of unanimi-
ty rule in their classic book that revived contractarianism. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 88-96 (1962); see also Mathias Dewatripont & Gerard Roland, Economic 
Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints, in 2 MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 415, 421 
(Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini eds., 1994) (“Unanimity might seem less relevant than 
majority for understanding the effects of political constraints. However, not only is unanimi-
ty required in many institutional contexts, but one might also view it as a way to model con-
sensual decision-making, whereas majority rule can be seen as a way to examine more con-
flictual contexts.”).  
117. See, e.g., ERIK BERGLÖF ET AL., BUILT TO LAST: A POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE FOR 
EUROPE 35 (2003) (“Small countries [in the EU] are concerned about the influence of large 
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states at the Constitutional Convention in 1787.118 They prefer risking paralysis 
under unanimity rule to exploitation under majority rule. 
As more parties must cooperate, the transaction costs of cooperation in-
crease, and so does the probability of failure. Consequently, the probability that 
federal power is required to solve an interstate externality increases as the 
number of affected states increases. When all states are affected, as with mili-
tary defense and free trade, the advantages of federal power are overwhelming. 
Conversely, when two states are involved, the advantages of federal power are 
smaller.119 When the number of parties shrinks to two, there is no majority or 
minority, so the difference between unanimity rule and majority rule disap-
pears. Without majority rule, there is no holdout problem. Two-state externali-
ties pose a problem of bargaining, but not a problem of holdouts. Successful 
cooperation is much more likely when it involves a bargaining problem be-
tween two states than when it involves a holdout problem among many states. 
Even so, the nation’s experience under the Articles of Confederation included 
important examples where two states failed to cooperate.120 
In interpreting the Constitution, a rule is required to bound federal power. 
The Commerce Clause grants federal regulatory power over commerce “among 
the several States,” which always has been understood to include two or more 
 
countries . . . .”); JANUSZ BUGAJSKI & ILONA TELEKI, ATLANTIC BRIDGES: AMERICA’S NEW 
EUROPEAN ALLIES 30 (2007) (“The smaller states, including the newcomers, seek access to 
the higher reaches of the EU leadership and fear being marginalized by the bigger powers.”); 
CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 115, at 57 (“The [Constitutional Treaty] had important insti-
tutional implications for the European Council. Some Member States felt that the Presidency 
should no longer rotate between States on a six-monthly basis, since they believed that this 
would not work within an enlarged Union, which required greater continuity of policy. This 
view was advocated by a number of the larger States, but was opposed by some of the small-
er States, which felt that the Presidency of the European Council would be dominated by the 
larger Member States.”). 
118. Madison thought his fellow delegates were concerned about the wrong sort of divi-
sion. In response to delegates who stressed conflicts between large and small states, Madison 
stated that “the great division of interests in the U. States. . . . did not lie between the large & 
small States: it lay between the Northern & Southern.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 486. 
119. Even in the two-state scenario, the advantages of federal power are often signifi-
cant, which helps to explain why the Constitution extends federal judicial power “to Contro-
versies between two or more States.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
120. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton) (detailing land disputes be-
tween Connecticut and Pennsylvania and between New York and Vermont, and describing 
Connecticut’s “disposition to retaliation” in response to Rhode Island’s passage of laws vi-
olating private contracts). Hamilton expressed this concern:  
America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league offensive and de-
fensive, would by the operation of such opposite and jarring alliances [between different 
states and foreign nations] be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European 
politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts, into which she was divided 
would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the 
enemies of them all. 
Id. 
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states.121 Given experience under the Articles of Confederation, “more States 
than one” was a natural boundary to draw as the lower limit for the power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. As we show in Part III, the Framers 
wrote Section 8 to give Congress power over interstate externalities and inter-
state markets, regardless of whether they affect two states or many states. The 
fact that Congress possesses this power, however, does not mean that it should 
always exercise it. Rather, Congress should exercise its regulatory power only 
when two or more states fail to promote the general welfare because they can-
not cooperate with one another.122  
D. Political Logic of U.S. Federalism 
To review, benefits and costs that spill across state lines create an incentive 
for each state to free ride on the efforts of other states. The incentive to free 
ride exists if spillovers affect two states or many states. If the problem is not 
addressed, citizens will suffer from too few interstate public goods, too many 
harmful interstate externalities, and not enough interstate commerce. To over-
come this problem, states may compact with one another. Compacts that re-
quire unanimity impose high transactions costs on collective action. Transac-
tion costs increase sharply with the number of states that must cooperate 
together. If the compact encompasses many states, holdouts will paralyze it. 
The central government operating through majority rule can find solutions that 
elude states cooperating through unanimity rule. Empowering Congress ani-
mates collective action, but risks exploiting states in the minority. Thus, majori-
ty rule ideally extends far enough to solve the problem of public goods, harmful 
externalities, and interstate markets, but no further in order to reduce the danger 
of exploitation. Balancing these considerations leads to the internalization prin-
ciple: assign power to the smallest unit of government that internalizes the ef-
fects of its exercise.  
III. ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 
We have explained the political logic at the foundation of the internaliza-
tion principle. The internalization principle grounds our analysis of the enume-
rated powers in Article I, Section 8, to which we now turn. In the system 
created by the U.S. Constitution, the federal government is the smallest unit of 
government that always internalizes the effects of interstate public goods, ex-
ternalities, and markets. The internalization principle thus implies that Con-
gress should have constitutional authority to solve these collective action prob-
 
121. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (“Comprehensive as the word 
‘among’ is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States 
than one.”).  
122. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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lems. This explanation, although incomplete,123 is fundamental for understand-
ing the allocation of powers in Article I, Section 8.  
A. Analysis of Section 8 
Figure 1 assigns numbers to the eighteen clauses of Section 8. The General 
Welfare Clause, which comes first, authorizes Congress to “lay and collect 
Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the Unit-
ed States.”124 A list of sixteen specific powers follows. The final clause autho-
rizes Congress to use the means “necessary and proper” to achieve the pre-
viously authorized ends—the Necessary and Proper Clause.125 
 
123. A complete discussion would consider the separation and interrelation of powers at 
the national level, including such topics as the bicameralism and presentment requirements 
of Article I, Section 7; instability under majority rule, including the empty core of a game of 
redistribution by majority rule, see supra note 114; and the agency problem of representation 
of citizens by officials, including lobbying. For a discussion of these topics, see COOTER, 
supra note 104, at 171-239. These are matters of political logic. A complete theory would 
have to go beyond logic in explaining politics. 
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
125. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  
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FIGURE 1 
The Eighteen Clauses in Article I, Section 8 
 
The Congress shall have Power  
1. To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States; 
2. To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; 
3. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes; 
4. To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the sub-
ject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; 
5. To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the 
Standard of Weights and Measures; 
6. To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current 
Coin of the United States; 
7. To establish Post Offices and post Roads; 
8. To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries; 
9. To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; 
10. To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 
Offenses against the Law of Nations; 
11. To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water; 
12. To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use 
shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
13. To provide and maintain a Navy; 
14. To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces; 
15. To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions; 
16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for go-
verning such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the Unit-
ed States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Of-
ficers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress; 
17. To exercise exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District 
(not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, 
and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of 
the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased 
by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, 
for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other 
needful Buildings;—And 
18. To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Ex-
ecution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Consti-
tution in the Government of the United States or in any Department or of-
ficer thereof. 
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Figure 2 sorts the specific powers into three analytical categories that we 
will explain. 
 
FIGURE 2  




We begin with interstate externalities. Clause 1 authorizes Congress to “lay 
and collect Taxes . . . to . . . provide for the common Defence,”126 and Clauses 
10 through 16 confer specific powers of national defense. In economics text-
books, military defense is the standard example of a good with positive exter-
nalities that affect an entire nation. Without a federal army, each state would 
have to provide for its own defense. The benefits of defense in one state would 
spill over to people in another state. The provider would have no practical way 
to collect fees from out-of-state beneficiaries to pay for the costs of defense. So 
each state would have an incentive to free ride on the security provided by oth-
 
126. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
A. Interstate Externalities 
National defense 
1.   Common defense 
10. Suppress piracy 
11. Declare war 
12. Raise armies 
13. Maintain navy 
14. Make military law 
15. Call militia 
16. Govern militia 
7.   Establish post offices 
8.   Make intellectual property law 
B. Interstate Markets 
3.   Regulate interstate and foreign commerce 
4.   Naturalization law 
4.   Bankruptcy law  
5.   Issue money 
5.   Fix weights and measures 
6.   Punish counterfeiting  
C. Federal Administration 
1.   Taxes and duties 
2.   Issue bonds 
9.   Create lower federal courts  
17. Govern D.C. & federal buildings in states  
18. Make laws necessary & proper to execute these and other powers 
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er states, leaving each of the states insecure.  
As explained in Part II.A, a positive interstate externality exists when an 
activity in one state benefits people in another state who do not pay for it. Giv-
en the technical characteristics of the activity, the provider in one state has no 
practical way to collect fees from the beneficiaries in another state. Congress, 
which does not suffer this disadvantage, can provide for the common defense 
much more effectively than the states.  
After the common defense, Clause 7 refers to the next power embodying 
positive externalities: the federal post office. The post office is a network that 
becomes more valuable for each user as it acquires more pick-up and delivery 
points. If the postal industry consisted of several private firms that cooperated, 
each firm’s activity would expand the network and thus benefit the other firms. 
In this respect, the post office in the eighteenth century resembles the railroad 
in the nineteenth century and the Internet in the twentieth century. Modern le-
gal scholars who observed positive externalities on the Internet called them 
“network effects.”127  
Given network effects, the initial problem is to grow the industry enough 
so that costs fall to the point of economic viability. In this respect, the federal 
government’s interest in promoting the post office in the eighteenth century re-
sembles its concern with promoting the railroad in the nineteenth century and 
the Internet in the twentieth century.  
Once such an industry is viable, competition often propels the market to-
wards a single provider or a small number of very large providers, as with the 
railroads in the nineteenth century and Google in the late twentieth century. A 
large firm can internalize positive externalities and lower the transaction costs 
of coordination. Economists call this situation a “natural monopoly.” With a 
natural monopoly at the national level, the federal government appropriately 
stands ready to constrain the dominant firm through antitrust laws and regula-
tions, or to provide the service itself.128 
Proceeding down the rows of Figure 2, we turn to Clause 8, which empow-
ers Congress to make intellectual property law. An inventor without a patent 
cannot prevent someone else from copying her invention, and an author without 
a copyright cannot prevent someone else from reprinting her book. Effective 
 
127. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and 
the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS 
J. 383, 402 n.62 (2007) (“A network effect exists if consumers’ valuation of the good in-
creases with the number of users of the good; this leads to an externality because a user who 
considers joining the network does not consider the positive impact of his adoption decision 
on other users.” (citing Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, 
and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985) (defining network effects))). 
128. Note, however, that rapid technological change undermines the case for govern-
ment intervention in natural monopolies by making them vulnerable to innovation. Thus, 
telephone systems exhibit natural monopoly, but the case for regulating long-distance carri-
ers was greater before cell phones and the Internet created dynamic competition.  
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intellectual property law enables creators to collect fees from users of their cre-
ations, which provides an incentive for creativity.129 Because the problem of 
unauthorized use extends across state lines, the problem is national and Con-
gress is better placed than the states to solve it. Federal intellectual property 
laws enable creators to collect fees from users across the nation, which creates 
a unified national market for creative works.  
Military defense, the postal service, and intellectual property affect the 
“general” welfare because of positive interstate externalities. Now our analysis 
turns from interstate externalities to national markets. The publication of Adam 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in 1776 systematically explained the advantages 
of free markets and free trade for a nation. In the same year, America declared 
its independence. Subsequently, the young nation’s unhappy experience under 
the Articles of Confederation confirmed Smith’s ideas about the disadvantages 
of fettered markets and trade barriers.130  
In the eighteenth century, America faced the problem of creating a unified 
market for goods, capital, and labor. Legal obstacles to the movement of re-
sources inhibit national markets. In contrast, a uniform regulatory framework 
lubricates national markets for some goods. Recognizing the federal govern-
ment’s decisive advantage over state governments, the drafters of the Constitu-
tion in 1787 gave Congress the power to create unified national markets in 
Clauses 3 through 6. 
 
129. Scholars are now engaged in a lively debate about where intellectual property 
rights should expand and where they should contract. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2008); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 471-75 (2003) (“rais[ing] 
questions concerning the widely accepted proposition that economic efficiency requires that 
copyright protection should be limited in its duration”); Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The 
Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004) (“The idea here is that we need to build a 
layer of reasonable copyright law, by showing the world a layer of reasonable copyright law 
resting on top of the extremes. Take this world that is increasingly a world by default regu-
lating all and change it into a world where once again we can see the mix between all, none, 
and some, using the technology of the Creative Commons.”).  
130. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (emphasizing the “tenden-
cies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among . . . the States under 
the Articles of Confederation” (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 
(1979))). Justice Jackson once recounted this history on behalf of the Court:  
 When victory relieved the Colonies from the pressure for solidarity that war had exerted, 
a drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states began. “. . . [E]ach State 
would legislate according to its estimate of its own interests, the importance of its own prod-
ucts, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its position in a political or commercial 
view.” This came “to threaten at once the peace and safety of the Union.” The sole purpose 
for which Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately produced the Constitution was 
“to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situations 
and trade of the said States; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regula-
tions may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony” and for that 
purpose the General Assembly of Virginia in January of 1786 named commissioners and 
proposed their meeting with those from other states. 
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (omission in original) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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Congress used this power. Labor mobility increased as a result of uniform 
federal laws enacted pursuant to Clause 3, such as social security and civil 
rights, and as a consequence of naturalization laws passed pursuant to Clause 4. 
Stability and trust in capital markets increased following federal statutes 
enacted pursuant to Clause 3, such as federal deposit insurance, compulsory 
disclosure by issuers of stocks, registration of brokers, and uniform bankruptcy 
law passed pursuant to Clause 4. Federal statutes enacted pursuant to Clause 3 
also provide the legal foundation for specific industries such as radio and tele-
vision, in which the Federal Communications Commission prevents broadcas-
ters from interfering with one another. The dormant Commerce Clause, which 
the Supreme Court has inferred from the grant of power to Congress in Clause 
3, usually prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce or 
placing an undue burden on the interstate movement of goods and services.131 
The transaction costs of interstate trade fell because Congress created a com-
mon currency as authorized in Clauses 5 and 6, and established national stan-
dards for weights and measures as authorized in Clause 5. Taken together, these 
actions made the United States into the world’s largest zone of unrestricted 
mobility of goods, capital, and labor for more than 150 years,132 which goes far 
towards explaining the country’s remarkable economic performance.133  
Implementing the preceding powers requires federal administration. Claus-
es 1, 2, 9, 17, and 18 authorize robust means to achieve the ends specified in 
the other clauses.  
In sum, the theory of collective action federalism reads Section 8 as a uni-
fied whole, like a well-written paragraph. Clause 1 is the topic sentence that 
expresses the unifying principle of a federal government empowered to pro-
mote the general welfare. Clauses 2 though 17 provide illuminating instances of 
the principle that were most important at the time the Framers wrote the para-
graph. And Clause 18, the Necessary and Proper Clause, concludes by unders-
coring the broad availability of means to realize both the general principle and 
specific instances of it.134  
 
131. For a cogent discussion of contemporary doctrine, see Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472-
73. There are two exceptions to the dormant commerce principle: congressional approval 
and market participation by states. We do not discuss them here.  
132. The European Union has eclipsed the United States as the world’s largest zone of 
unrestricted mobility. Like the United States, moreover, Europe has experienced unprece-
dented, sustained economic growth.  
133. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 538 (“The material success that has come 
to inhabitants of the states which make up this federal free trade unit has been the most im-
pressive in the history of commerce, but the established interdependence of the states only 
emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens 
and repressions.”). 
134. See supra note 55 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall’s language in McCulloch). Not-
ably, in our account, the Necessary and Proper Clause is primarily a reminder. Similarly, 
Chief Justice Marshall already had decided McCulloch in favor of the federal government 
before he turned to the Necessary and Proper Clause. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411 (“But 
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B. Collective Action Federalism and Other Parts of the Constitution 
Our analysis of Article I, Section 8 does not address the proper interpreta-
tion of other parts of the Constitution. We believe, although we do not establish 
here, that the logic of collective action persuasively explains most of the prohi-
bitions on state conduct in Article I, Section 10.135 These include the various 
restrictions on states conducting their own foreign policies in the realms of in-
terstate or international politics and economics.136  
By contrast, a collective action approach almost certainly does not explain 
the proper scope of federal powers authorized by the enforcement clauses of the 
Civil War Amendments.137 These amendments dramatically changed the bal-
ance of power between the federal government and the states by authorizing 
congressional regulation of certain subject matters—including, but not limited 
to, racial inequality. These amendments especially aimed to grant basic consti-
tutional rights previously denied to minority groups. Minorities had been ex-
cluded because collective action had succeeded for the majority, not because it 
failed. We see no reason why the logic of collective action should guide inter-
pretation of these provisions.138 
 
the constitution of the United States has not left the right of Congress to employ the neces-
sary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the government, to general reason-
ing. To its enumeration of powers is added [the Necessary and Proper Clause].”). 
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; 
make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in payment of Debts; pass any Bill of At-
tainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title 
of Nobility.”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay 
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for 
executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any 
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all 
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 
3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, 
or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, 
or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent 
Danger as will not admit of delay.”).  
136. We express no view on whether the distinction between individual and collective 
action by (nation) states should guide interpretation of the Treaty Clause, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
Writing for the Court in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), Justice Holmes registered 
the existence of a multination problem of collective action. See infra note 227. Another set 
of questions concerns the constitutional implications of the fact that many collective action 
problems today are global in scope. So, for example, one might argue that Congress may not 
pass a law addressing the problem of global warming on the ground that one nation acting 
alone cannot meaningfully ameliorate a global collective action problem. A defender of such 
legislation might respond that the law would be sufficiently related to advancing the general 
welfare, such as by showing global leadership or by taking action in anticipation of eventual 
treaty negotiations. See infra Part V (discussing how courts might evaluate congressional 
judgments about collective action problems).  
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.  
138. One might argue that the profoundly transformative nature of the Civil War, Re-
construction, and the post-Civil War Amendments should inform the scope of congressional 
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C. Collective Action Federalism and Constitutional Disagreement 
When collective action problems harm all of the states, the justification of 
congressional power does not turn on the precise definition of externalities. 
Overlapping views about the nature of externalities suffice to justify congres-
sional authority under Article I, Section 8. In other cases, however, the interests 
of the states diverge, so one can anticipate vigorous disagreements about the 
nature and extent of externalities.139 Our analytical framework for interpreting 
Section 8 encompasses robust disagreements about the appropriate scope of 
federal power. If the theory of collective action federalism gained general sup-
port, then hard cases involving the enumerated powers might resemble many 
environmental disputes. In such disputes, cost-benefit analysis is a basic me-
thod for focusing debates. Putting numbers on divergent values identifies the 
important areas where differences in values yield different policy decisions. 
Focus improves debate so much that the law often mandates cost-benefit analy-
sis in environmental impact statements. Environmental impact statements thus 
illustrate our claim that externalities provide a useful framework within which 
parties can dispute legal questions, including the enumerated powers. 
Disagreements about interstate externalities will follow predictable politi-
cal lines. People who seek to reduce federal power will argue that, beyond na-
tional defense, interstate public goods are few in number. They will also articu-
late a narrow understanding of interstate externalities, and they will contend 
that national markets are self-regulating. Conversely, those who aim to expand 
federal power will argue that interstate public goods are numerous, including 
education, research, poverty relief, the arts, and the environment. They will also 
maintain that national markets often fail without federal regulation.140 And in 
addition to material externalities, they will point to psychological externali-
ties,141 such as the concerns of people in one state for the health, education, en-
 
power under Article I, Section 8—that Section 8 should not be read in isolation of them. 
Such an historical argument, if persuasively developed, obviously would require modifica-
tion of our own account.  
139. In technical terms, collective action problems that harm all of the states are Pareto 
inefficiencies, whereas collective action problems that harm some states a lot and benefit 
other states a little are cost-benefit inefficiencies. 
140. It would be a mistake to code those who seek to limit federal power as “conserva-
tive” and those who seek to promote it as “liberal.” There are different kinds of conserva-
tives and liberals on federalism questions. There are also different kinds of federalism ques-
tions. For example, many social conservatives would vigorously defend a federal law 
banning abortion. Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). And many liberals often 
oppose broad federal preemption of state law. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 
(2009); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). 
141. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 570, 638-48 (1996) (discussing different kinds of externalities, including psychological 
externalities). Amartya Sen refers to this sort of externality as an instance of “sympathy.” 
Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic 
Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 326-29 (1977). 
COOTER AND SIEGEL 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2010 12:57 PM 
December 2010] COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM 153 
vironment, and physical or financial security of people in another state. Psycho-
logical externalities can be particularly large in the wake of a natural disas-
ter,142 such as Hurricane Katrina or the recent earthquake in Haiti.143  
If weak feelings that people in one state have for people in another count as 
interstate externalities, then collective action is a ubiquitous problem and our 
framework would impose no limits on federal action. In principle, unbounded 
expansion of the meaning of “externalities” would destroy the usefulness of the 
concept and vindicate the general complaint that collective action federalism is 
too indeterminate for use in constitutional interpretation.144  
In fact, economists faced this problem long ago and they bounded the con-
cept of externalities sufficiently for cost-benefit analysis to become a basic tool 
for debating public policy. In the economics tradition, feelings count as costs 
and benefits only if people are willing to pay to vindicate them. Cheap talk 
does not suffice. Under this approach, the concerns of people in one state for 
what happens in another state count as interstate externalities to the extent that 
they are willing to pay to vindicate them. 
Could the standard of “willingness to pay” achieve the same success in 
constitutional law by limiting the feelings that count as interstate externali-
ties?145 We can only mention a few of the difficult questions that require an-
 
142. This is not to suggest that one must invoke the idea of psychological externalities 
in order to justify federal disaster relief. A large disaster has humanitarian consequences that 
the federal government can relieve far better than the states. For example, the federal gov-
ernment can maintain a field hospital to deploy to any state facing a medical disaster. One 
federal field hospital is cheaper and more effective than each state maintaining its own field 
hospital, or one state maintaining such a hospital and charging other states for its use. Simi-
larly, much disaster relief rebuilds infrastructure such as roads and bridges. The localities 
and states that build roads and bridges cannot insure them privately against disasters. So fed-
eral relief for disastrous destruction of infrastructure fills a hole in insurance markets for 
states.  
143. An interstate externality refers to interdependence in the utility functions of indi-
viduals in at least two states. Mathematics can handle interdependence regardless of whether 
it is material or psychological. But the measurement of some kinds of externalities is easier 
than others, notably the traditional, material externalities. The history of cost-benefit analy-
sis, however, is in part a history of learning to measure what was previously unmeasurable. 
144. Cf., e.g., Esty, supra note 141, at 595 n.73 (“Indeed, without a ‘willingness to pay’ 
mechanism to check the reality and depth of [psychological] harms, there exists a moral ha-
zard problem of potentially significant proportions because those claiming injury have little 
reason to report accurately on their welfare losses and much reason to exaggerate.”). For re-
levant economic writing, see Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. 
POL. ECON. 152 (1970) (explaining why meddlesome preferences erode the usefulness of 
Pareto efficiency); cf. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. 1956) (1859) (proposing the “harm” principle to cabin the circumstances in which others 
may interfere with the liberty of the individual).  
145. Constitutional law has struggled with the problem of psychological harm in the 
context of standing doctrine. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 760 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“In this environmental con-
text I personally prefer the older and particularly pertinent observation and warning of John 
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swers. One normative question that must be confronted is whether certain 
second-order preferences should be ruled out-of-bounds on moral grounds no 
matter how much individuals are willing to pay to vindicate them. Another 
question is whether willingness to pay is an appropriate measure of welfare ef-
fects when individuals care intensely but lack the ability to pay. “Ability to 
pay” refers to a person’s income and wealth. The most common approach to 
cost-benefit analysis gives the same weight to how much people are willing to 
pay even though they differ in their ability to pay. A less common but familiar 
approach in economics gives more weight to the willingness of poor people to 
pay.146  
We further note that the theory of collective action federalism addresses 
the substantive meaning of Article I, Section 8, not the institutional roles of 
Congress and the Court in constitutional interpretation and implementation.147 
Those who endorse vigorous judicial review of federalism questions will in-
terpret our framework primarily in terms of how courts should restrain Con-
gress. Those who favor judicial deference to Congress will interpret our 
framework primarily in terms of congressional self-restraint and the political 
safeguards of federalism.148 
There is much to be gained from an analytical framework that encompasses 
disagreements. Theory directs research towards missing information that often 
advances policy debates and occasionally ends them. Collective action federal-
ism directs political disagreements into debates about the scope of public 
goods, externalities, and markets. Applying our framework requires extensive 
factfinding, which interacts with contestable normative judgments.149 Finding 
 
Donne.” (referencing Devotions XVII)). 
146. For an illuminating discussion, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay 
vs. Welfare, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 303 (2007). Willingness to pay is also not an appro-
priate criterion in certain situations regardless of whether it accurately measures welfare, 
such as in matters of basic human rights.  
147. Similarly, Jack Balkin distinguishes questions of fidelity to the Constitution from 
questions of institutional responsibility. See Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, 
in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 11, 20 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) 
(“Many theories of constitutional interpretation conflate two different questions. The first is 
the question of what the Constitution means and how to be faithful to it. The second asks 
how a person in a particular institutional setting—like an unelected judge with life tenure—
should interpret the Constitution and implement it through doctrinal constructions and appli-
cations.”). 
148. There is a robust and longstanding debate over the political safeguards of federal-
ism in constitutional law and theory. See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 
47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The 
Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341; Herbert Wechsler, The 
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection 
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).  
149. An example of a contestable normative concept is national identity. Cf., e.g., Esty, 
supra note 141, at 640 (“Interest in distant environmental harms may derive from a sense of 
community identity that exceeds narrow jurisdictional bounds.”); id. at 641 n.267 (“A num-
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the scope of interstate externalities and market failures requires mathematical 
theory, econometrics, cost-benefit analysis, psychological surveys, behavioral 
experiments, etc. Social scientists from across the political spectrum generally 
embrace these techniques, although they often reach different conclusions when 
using them. In cases where our framework does not end disagreement, it directs 
argument towards questions that matter to the general welfare, not towards 
formal distinctions that do not matter. 
D. Collective Action Federalism and Theories of Interpretation 
Philip Bobbitt, in his 1982 book Constitutional Fate,150 catalogued six 
kinds of constitutional arguments that lawyers, judges, and legal academics use. 
Historical arguments appeal either to preratification history or to postratifica-
tion history. Prudential or consequentialist arguments identify the good or bad 
social consequences of an interpretation. Textual arguments rely on the text of 
the Constitution and the rules for interpreting texts. Structural arguments draw 
inferences from the theory and structure of government created by the Constitu-
tion. Precedential arguments offer the existence of previous decisions, either 
past political practice or past judicial rulings, as justifying a certain outcome in 
a later case. Finally, ethos arguments tell a story about national identity; they 
tend to take a narrative or historical form and inquire whether a given interpre-
tation is faithful to the meaning or destiny of the country, its deepest cultural 
commitments, or its national character. 
Interpretations of the Constitution often invoke multiple forms of constitu-
tional authority to support the same conclusions, as we have done for collective 
action federalism. Part I looked to preratification history for inspiration and 
support, but not for decisive guidance; we honored the general intentions of the 
Framers in drafting Article I, Section 8 without expounding the original mean-
ing of “the general Welfare” or any other language in Section 8.151 Besides pre-
 
ber of existing federal environmental programs seem to reflect . . . a national ecological and 
political identity that spans the fifty states. One could argue, for example, that the Clean Wa-
ter Act’s construction grants program, providing federal funds to build wastewater treatment 
facilities, represents a commitment that no American should live in a community where un-
treated sewage flows into nearby rivers.”). 
150. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). 
151. Originalists and their critics make distinctions that we do not address, such as the 
difference between the intent of the Framers and the intent of the Ratifiers, and the differ-
ences between original intent and original meaning. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 7-
11 (discussing these distinctions). An originalist theory must cope with the fact that Hamil-
ton and Madison vigorously debated the meaning of the General Welfare Clause during the 
Constitution’s first fifteen years, which suggests the existence of original meanings, not a 
single, definitive understanding. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text; see also, 
e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936) (discussing Madison’s restrictive view 
of the General Welfare Clause and Hamilton’s expansive view). As one prominent historian 
has written:  
Both the framing of the Constitution in 1787 and its ratification by the states involved 
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ratification history, Part I also relied on postratification history, where we made 
both traditionalist and antitraditionalist claims. We drew support both from 
how later generations of Americans understood Section 8 and from some of the 
mistakes that they made. Part II developed a theory to predict the consequences 
of alternative interpretations of Section 8. Part III proceeded from explicating 
the text of Section 8 into an analysis of its language and organization. Looking 
ahead, Part IV will examine judicial precedent in detail. We have not developed 
an ethos argument in favor of collective action federalism, but a promising 
narrative might portray Americans past and present as eminently practical 
people who have valued federalism primarily as a tool for solving social prob-
lems and governing effectively, not for reasons of identity or ideology.  
As revealed by Parts II and III, our primary interpretive approaches are 
structural and consequentialist. We have sought to interpret Article I, Section 8 
by drawing “inference[s] from the structures and relationships created by the 
constitution,”152 most especially the maintenance of a federal system that pre-
supposes the continued existence of the states and that endows the federal gov-
ernment with authority to solve problems that the states cannot solve on their 
own. Using modern economic theory, we have pursued a consequentialist in-
quiry to identify the logic of such problems and to explain how federalism can 
ameliorate them. We use modern analytical tools unknown to the Framers to 
help us assign meaning to the language of Article I, Section 8. Without these 
tools, our account might not crystallize in one’s mind.  
Because the theory of collective action federalism is not an originalist 
theory, it can accommodate substantial historical changes, including changes in 
constitutional meaning.153 The most important for our purposes concerns the 
 
processes of collective decision-making whose outcomes necessarily reflected a bewildering 
array of intentions and expectations, hopes and fears, genuine compromises and agreements 
to disagree. The discussions of both stages of this process consisted largely of highly prob-
lematic predictions of the consequences of particular decisions. In this context, it is not im-
mediately apparent how the historian goes about divining the true intentions or understand-
ings of the roughly two thousand actors who served in the various conventions that framed 
and ratified the Constitution, much less the larger electorate that they claimed to 
represent . . . . [T]he notion that the Constitution had some fixed and well-known meaning at 
the moment of its adoption dissolves into a mirage. 
RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 6. 
152. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 
(1969). 
 153. At the opposite end of the interpretive spectrum from originalism lies the view that 
evolving social values inform the meaning of the Constitution. See generally, e.g., ROBERT 
C. POST, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: 
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 23 (1995); Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial 
Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959 (2008). As social values change, according to this view, 
so may the legally authoritative understanding of the Constitution. Compare, e.g., Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]hat our understanding of 
the Constitution does change from time to time has been settled since John Marshall 
breathed life into its text.”), with id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court reaches this 
implausible result by purporting to advert, not to the original meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment, but to ‘the evolving standards of decency’ of our national society.” (citation 
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changes in understanding of the sorts of problems that implicate the general 
welfare. Just as the Founders improved their understanding of the “general 
Welfare” from their experiences under the Articles of Confederation, so we can 
improve our understanding of this phrase from subsequent historical expe-
rience, the emergence of a modern economy and integrated society, contempo-
rary social science, and the kinds of problems facing the United States today.154  
The specific powers in Article I, Section 8 address the collective action 
problems of the eighteenth century. Two hundred years of social, economic, 
and technological change have added to the list. In Part IV.C, we will discuss 
one such addition: environmental protection. We cannot discuss others given 
limited space, but we can suggest what they might be. For this purpose, Figure 
3 compares eighteenth century problems addressed by the specific powers in 
Article I, Section 8 to twenty-first century equivalents. The Figure also identi-
fies the relevant collective action problems among the states. Justice Cardozo 
may have had in mind some of the changes reflected in Figure 3 when he wrote 
 
omitted)). Over time, most Americans have broadened their appreciation of interstate exter-
nalities that warrant federal intervention. Daniel Esty makes related points in focusing on the 
“choice of public” issue that arises in the context of psychological externalities. See Esty, 
supra note 141, at 594-97, 638-47; id. at 597 (“It is clear . . . that in environmental policy-
making, the sphere of affected interests may expand or contract depending on an evolving 
definition of community.”); id. at 646-47 (“[T]o the extent that we have a national political 
identity as Americans, there will be [a] . . . set of environmental rules that represents the 
moral behavioral minimum that each citizen owes to his fellow citizens.”).  
154. While we propose a flexible framework for understanding the general welfare, 
some modern scholars who have investigated the original meaning of the “general Welfare” 
have reached strong conclusions. One has argued that the original meaning precludes federal 
spending “for the special welfare of particular regions or states.” John C. Eastman, Restoring 
the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 65 (2001) (“Congress, I 
contend, has only the power to spend for the ‘general’ welfare and not for the special welfare 
of particular regions or states, even if the spending was undertaken in all regions or all states 
and therefore might be said to enhance ‘general’ welfare in the aggregate.”). Others have 
maintained that the General Welfare Clause does not authorize any federal spending. See 
David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 216 (1995) 
(“Congress’ power to spend does not derive from that so-called ‘General Welfare’ Clause, 
but instead derives from two overlapping but independent provisions found elsewhere in the 
Constitution. . . . Th[e] ‘Property Clause’ is ample to authorize all federal spending, whether 
or not it is also authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause.” (footnote omitted)); Jeffrey 
T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the President’s Paramour): An Examination of the 
Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States 
Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 142, 144 (1999) (“The [General Welfare C]lause 
is not . . . a grant of power to spend. . . . The General Welfare Clause is an intentionally re-
dundant limit on the tax power.”). Still another commentator has discerned in the original 
meaning of the clause not just a failure to authorize federal spending, but also a significant 
restriction on federal authority—namely, “a standard of impartiality borrowed from the law 
of trusts.” Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay 
in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (“Examination of history . . . 
shows that the General Welfare Clause is more than a mere ‘non-grant’ of spending power. It 
was intended to be a sweeping denial of power—specifically, it was intended to impose on 
Congress a standard of impartiality borrowed from the law of trusts, thereby limiting the leg-
islature’s capacity to ‘play favorites’ with federal tax money.”).  
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for the Court in 1937 that the concept of the general welfare is not “static” and 
“[n]eeds that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our 
day with the well-being of the Nation.”155 
 
FIGURE 3:  
Modern Analogies to Specific Powers in Article I, Section 8 
 
18th Century Problem 21st Century Problem General Problem 




Infrastructure with  
   network effects 
5.   Money Credit cards 
Internet payments 
Fedwire 
Medium of exchange 
8.   Intellectual  
        property 
Newly created species 
Computer programs 
Nonappropriable  
   creations 




4.   Naturalization Illegal immigration 
Immigration policy 
Labor law 
Spillover across states 
Race-to-bottom 
4.   Bankruptcy Distressed firms 
Tort creditors 
Race-to-bottom 
5.   Weights and  
        measures 
Credit card regulation 
Computer protocols 
Truth in labeling 
Set standards 
Asymmetrical information 
Adverse selection against  
   quality 
6.   Counterfeiting High-tech fakes Asymmetrical  
   information 
Adverse selection  
   against quality 
2.   Bonds New forms of  
   government debt 
Finance government  
   activity 
3.   Interstate  
        commerce 
Interstate services Sustain national markets 
11. Declare war 
12. Raise armies 
13. Maintain navy 
14. Make military law 
15. Call militia 
16. Govern militia 
Unconventional wars  
   (terrorism, counter- 
   insurgency, failed  
   states) 
Positive externalities 
 
155. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937) (emphasis added); see also New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“The Federal Government undertakes ac-
tivities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers . . . . Yet the powers con-
ferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad 
enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role.”). 
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IV. EXPLAINING (OR IMPROVING) CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDINGS 
The preceding Part showed that collective action federalism provides a 
sound structural and consequentialist understanding of the division of powers 
between the federal government and the states in Article I, Section 8. Collective 
action federalism clarifies how members of Congress should interpret their 
constitutional powers—that is, when they should vigorously use the authority 
granted by Article I, Section 8 and when they should leave problems for the 
states to address. Sometimes state cooperation is likely to succeed, as when the 
need for cooperation involves only two states and they are disposed to coope-
rate. In such circumstances, Congress should not exercise its power.156 Rather, 
it should allow the affected states to solve the problem on their own. Other 
times, state cooperation is unlikely to succeed, as when the need for coopera-
tion involves numerous states, or when states face historical or political ob-
stacles to cooperation. In such situations, Congress should exercise its constitu-
tional power. 
Turning from Congress to the courts, we reiterate that we say nothing 
about whether courts should engage in judicial review of federalism questions. 
We argue, rather, that if courts do engage in such review, they should use the 
theory of collective action federalism to understand the clauses of Section 8. 
We now consider judicial interpretation of Article I, Section 8 by Justices 
past and present. We will identify substantial support for the theory of collec-
tive action federalism in the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article I, 
Section 8, both during the Chief Justiceship of John Marshall and since 1937. 
We further identify ways to improve existing constitutional understandings, in-
cluding judicial doctrine, by taking more explicit account of the existence or 
nonexistence of collective problems involving more than one state.  
This Part will focus on the two most important and controversial clauses of 
Section 8. First, our discussion of the Commerce Clause will identify the bases 
in case law for replacing the distinction between economic and noneconomic 
activity with the distinction between collective and individual choice by states. 
This discussion also encompasses the dormant Commerce Clause, whose justi-
fication we locate in the collective action problems motivating each state to im-
pede business competition from other states. Second, our discussion of the 
General Welfare Clause explains why it could bear some of the justificatory 
burden of federal regulation that courts currently assign to the Commerce 
Clause.  
A. The Commerce Clause 
Recall that Chief Justice Marshall upheld congressional power to regulate 
 
156. We do not provide here a public choice analysis of the circumstances in which 
Congress would be willing to exercise self-restraint.  
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navigation between states in Gibbons v. Ogden. To reach this result, he read the 
word “among” in the phrase, “To regulate commerce . . . among the several 
States,” to mean “intermingled with,” and he stated that navigation intermin-
gled commerce in one state with commerce from another state.157 Collective 
action federalism supports this interpretation of the Commerce Clause. When 
commerce from different states intermingles, large economic advantages come 
from uniformity, access, and coordination in the channels and instrumentalities 
of commerce. Thus a road across one state is far more valuable if it connects to 
a road across another state; a flood control program upstream is more effective 
if it coordinates with a flood control program downstream; standardized electric 
plugs are more useful than heterogeneous plugs; and the Internet is more valua-
ble than unconnected intranets. Instead of uniformity, access, and coordination, 
firms often seek diversity, closure, and noncooperation by state governments to 
protect against competition. In Gibbons itself, the beneficiary of a state-granted 
navigation monopoly claimed interference by a federal licensee. Like exclusio-
nary tariffs, such policies create modest individual advantages and massive col-
lective costs. Marshall’s decision gives Congress the power to solve this collec-
tive action problem for the channels and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce. 
The theory of collective action federalism is also consistent with many of 
the Court’s post-1937 Commerce Clause decisions. For example, Wickard v. 
Filburn158 is controversial because of skepticism that federal power to regulate 
interstate commerce could possibly extend to home production of wheat. The 
case looks different in light of collective action federalism. Congress perceived 
a national problem of overproduction of wheat. A state could have ordered lim-
its on production within its own jurisdiction, which would have disadvantaged 
its producers relative to unrestricted producers in other states. The states thus 
faced insuperable difficulties cooperating together to limit wheat production 
(the “holdout problem”). In contrast, national regulation could effectively re-
duce production of wheat. The main question posed by this case for collective 
action federalism is whether home production undermines regulation of market 
production for wheat. This is a question of fact.  
During this post-1937 period of deference to Congress, the Court often de-
cided cases involving allegedly unfair economic competition among states. A 
central argument in these cases concerned whether an unfair practice in one ju-
risdiction conveyed a competitive advantage over another jurisdiction with a 
fair practice.159 In national markets, competition favors the lowest-cost produc-
 
157. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-97 (1824).  
158. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
159. Some scholars conceive of competitiveness effects that spill across jurisdictions as 
“economic externalities.” See, e.g., Esty, supra note 141, at 593; Richard B. Stewart, Inter-
national Trade and Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1329, 1340-41 (1992) (discussing “several different types of . . . externalities,” includ-
ing “[p]ollution spillovers,” “[r]esource externalities,” “[p]reservation externalities,” and 
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ers. Absent federal intervention, economic pressure will cause producers to 
adopt practices that lower costs, even when legislators and the public judges 
them to be unfair, such as paying low wages, permitting various forms of dis-
crimination in the workplace,160 or destroying the environment.161  
The Court used this argument in the 1941 case of United States v. Darby 
when it sustained federal minimum-wage and maximum-hour regulations on 
manufacturers of goods shipped in interstate commerce.162 The Court stated: 
[T]he evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard labor conditions 
through the use of the facilities of interstate commerce for competition by the 
goods so produced with those produced under the prescribed or better labor 
conditions; and the consequent dislocation of the commerce itself caused by 
the impairment or destruction of local businesses by competition made effec-
tive through interstate commerce. The Act is thus directed at the suppression 
of a method or kind of competition in interstate commerce which it has in ef-
fect condemned as “unfair” . . . .163 
 
“[c]ompetitiveness externalities”); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of 
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1196, 1211-12, 1215-19 (1977). 
160. Antidiscrimination provisions that cover the workplace may increase the costs of 
doing business. Accordingly, states may be disinclined to impose such costs on employers 
that operate within their jurisdictions unless a certain number of other states do the same. 
Thus the need for collective action can impede a state seeking to end workplace discrimina-
tion. Moreover, local discrimination against potential providers or consumers of goods and 
services may impede the development or functioning of national markets in various ways. 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), both of which upheld a federal prohibition on racial discrim-
ination in places of public accommodation, can be justified on this ground. When discrimi-
nation discourages the interstate movement of labor and capital, a collective action problem 
exists. 
161. Note that this is a statement about national markets, not externalities. Competitive 
pressures favoring the lowest-cost practices operate through markets, not externally to them. 
The confusion in language stems partly from Tibor Scitovsky’s description of market com-
petition as a “pecuniary” externality, which contradicts the idea that an externality is un-
priced. See Tibor Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External Economies, 62 J. POL. ECON. 143, 
146 (1954). 
162. 312 U.S. 100 (1941); see also Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 201-219 (2006). Darby overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and em-
braced the dissent of Justice Holmes. The post-1937 Court repudiated the pre-1937 Court’s 
insistence that “[t]here is no power vested in Congress to require the States to exercise their 
police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition.” Id. at 273. The pre-1937 Court 
described well the logic of collective action that it deemed unpersuasive: 
 It is further contended that the authority of Congress may be exerted to control interstate 
commerce in the shipment of child-made goods because of the effect of the circulation of 
such goods in other States where the evil of this class of labor has been recognized by local 
legislation, and the right to thus employ child labor has been more rigorously restrained than 
in the State of production. In other words, that the unfair competition, thus engendered, may 
be controlled by closing the channels of interstate commerce to manufacturers in those States 
where the local laws do not meet what Congress deems to be the more just standard of other 
States. 
Id. 
163. Darby, 312 U.S. at 122; see also id. at 115 (“The motive and purpose of the 
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The Darby Court thus viewed Congress as concerned about the “race to the 
bottom” that might ensue among the states in the absence of federal interven-
tion.164 
The Court later used a similar argument from collective action to justify 
federal regulation of environmentally destructive practices.165 In Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,166 the Court deemed significant a 
congressional finding that national “surface mining and reclamation standards 
are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce among 
sellers of coal produced in different States will not be used to undermine the 
ability of the several States to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal 
mining operations within their borders.”167 The Court emphasized that “[t]he 
prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role 
for congressional action under the Commerce Clause.”168  
Rather than focusing on races to the bottom, the Rehnquist Court empha-
sized the distinction between economic and noneconomic activity. As we saw 
in Part I.B.2, the modern Court has sought to impose limits on the power of 
Congress in order to preserve the separation of federal and state powers estab-
lished by Clause 3’s grant of authority to “regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States.” The Court has purported to find this limit by restricting regula-
tory power under the Commerce Clause to “economic” or “commercial” activi-
ty. 
Although current doctrine formally emphasizes the economic or noneco-
nomic nature of the regulated activity, a more functional logic may in fact have 
animated the Court in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. Just as the Court offered 
 
present regulation are plainly to make effective the Congressional conception of public poli-
cy that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribu-
tion of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to 
the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows.”).  
164. For the use of similar reasoning to defend the result in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), see Regan, supra note 7, at 603-04. For ongoing debates on 
races to the bottom (or top), see, for example: Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Stan-
dard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); 
Esty, supra note 141; Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Environmental Regu-
lation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitat-
ing Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal En-
vironmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing 
Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 278-85 (1997); and Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and 
the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in En-
vironmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67 (1996). 
165. The Court also used collective action reasoning in upholding the 1961 amend-
ments to the FLSA. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190-93 (1968), overruled by Nat’l 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
166. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
167. Id. at 281-82 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). 
168. Id. at 282.  
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collective action problems as a reason to sustain congressional regulation in 
many of the Commerce Clause cases decided from 1937 until the early 1990s, 
so too the Rehnquist Court implicitly has offered the absence (or presence) of a 
collective action problem as a reason to prohibit (or sustain) congressional reg-
ulation. Almost appearing to anticipate Raich, and with Wickard surely in 
mind, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Lopez that the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act “is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
were regulated.”169 This statement, particularly if one replaces the word “eco-
nomic” with “interstate,”170 suggests that the absence of regulation of guns 
near schools in one state would not undercut the effectiveness of regulations 
prohibiting them in other states. Justice Kennedy may have been getting at the 
same point when he stated in his concurring opinion that  
[i]f a State or municipality determines that harsh criminal sanctions are neces-
sary and wise to deter students from carrying guns on school premises, the re-
served powers of the States are sufficient to enact those measures. Indeed, over 
40 States already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on 
or near school grounds.171  
With independence rather than interdependence, the states do not face a collec-
tive action problem.172 
The key constitutional question posed by these and related criminal cases is 
how much coordination among law enforcement personnel in different states is 
required to police the proscribed conduct at issue. The question is whether there 
is a spillover of welfare and whether the spillover causes a collective action 
problem. The issue is not whether a crime is “economic” in nature. The general 
welfare is affected by the presence or absence of spillovers, not the formal cat-
egory of the activity.173  
 
169. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
170. See BREST ET AL., supra note 5, at 626. 
171. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Regan, 
supra note 7, at 566 (arguing that this is one way to read the portion of Kennedy’s opinion 
quoted in the text). 
172. On this view, a critic of Lopez would want to argue that Congress rationally could 
have viewed the Gun-Free School Zones Act as an important part of a larger, interstate regu-
lation of firearm sale, possession, and use that would have been undermined unless Congress 
were permitted to regulate gun possession in school zones. A critic of the Commerce Clause 
holding in Morrison would want to compile evidence of impediments to the interstate 
movement of women caused by state failures to protect them from gender-motivated vi-
olence. 
173. Anything can be included or excluded from a class by selecting its level of gene-
rality. Thus, horses belong to the class of mammals but not to the class of primates. Similar-
ly, wheat grown and consumed at home belongs to the class of “wheat” and to the class of 
“goods grown and consumed at home.” The former is a class of market goods and the latter 
is a class of non-market goods. There is no logical or natural way of choosing the class to 
which wheat grown and consumed at home belongs. It belongs to either of them depending 
on the purpose of the categorization. The correct level of generalization should be the con-
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For example, enforcing a prohibition on guns within school zones seems 
the opposite of a problem requiring coordination among law enforcement offic-
ers in different states. It seems local: local officials presumably have better in-
formation concerning who might carry firearms near schools, and better incen-
tives to do something about the problem. As we explained in Part II, these 
considerations are central to the internalization principle. By contrast, suppress-
ing a market for guns is a national problem in light of the ease with which fire-
arms can move across state lines. The failure to suppress such a market affects 
the ability of state law enforcement personnel to keep guns away from schools. 
The federal government in Lopez did not argue that the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act addressed this national problem or was otherwise an integral part of a larg-
er regulatory scheme.174  
Raich, by contrast, did involve a potential spillover problem. Given the in-
ability to distinguish marijuana used for medicinal purposes from marijuana 
used for other purposes, and given that the market for marijuana disrespects 
state borders, California’s authorization of marijuana use for medicinal purpos-
es might make it more difficult for other states to ban marijuana use. If there is 
no spillover problem for state policing, then states and localities should be 
permitted to go their own way as far as constitutional federalism is concerned. 
But if there is a spillover—for example, medical marijuana use in California 
makes it more difficult to police drug traffickers at the Arizona border—then 
there is a rationale for federal intervention. The distinction between individual 
and collective action, which collective action federalism uses to draw the limits 
and expanse of congressional power, best explains why Congress may not ordi-
narily use its commerce power to regulate such crimes as assault or gun posses-
sion in schools, but may regulate a multistate market for guns or drugs. 
Collective action federalism explains why the distinction between econom-
ic and noneconomic activity should not demarcate the boundary between feder-
al and state power in Clause 3. The main reason for separating powers is the 
relative advantages of the federal and state governments. The economic/ non-
economic distinction, however, does not systematically relate to the advantages 
of the federal and state governments. The federal government is not especially 
able in economic matters and the state governments are not especially able in 
noneconomic matters. This is because economic activities do not generally 
cause collective action problems, and noneconomic activities are not generally 
free from collective action problems. 
By contrast, the distinction between individual and collective action by 
states relates to the advantages of the federal and state governments. It gives 
independent, sensible meaning to the phrase “among the several States” in 
Clause 3. On our account, the phrase “among the several States” references a 
 
clusion of the Court’s decision, not its basis. 
174. See supra note 75 (quoting the Lopez Court’s description of why the government 
believed that prohibiting guns in schools is within the scope of the commerce power). 
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problem of collective action involving at least two states.175 That is the key in-
quiry in determining whether “Commerce” is interstate and thus regulable un-
der Clause 3 or intrastate and thus beyond the scope of the commerce power.176 
The power of Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States” given in Clause 3 is best understood in light of the collective action 
problems that the nation faced under the Articles of Confederation, when Con-
gress lacked this power. Interpreting this phrase requires a theoretical account 
of federalism. With such an account in mind, the economic/noneconomic cate-
gorization may suffice in a rough-and-ready way for defining “Commerce” in 
Clause 3; we have nothing to say about that subject. But without such an ac-
count, a dictionary definition of “economics” cannot yield the proper interpre-
tation of Clause 3. Moreover, reading the enumerated powers to exclude the 
regulation of “noneconomic” problems will frustrate the animating purpose of 
Section 8, which is to give Congress the authority to solve collective action 
problems. If interpretation of Clause 3 turns on the economic/noneconomic dis-
tinction, then pressure must mount to find authorization for regulatory powers 
elsewhere in the Constitution.177  
To further illustrate the difference between an analysis of collective action 
problems and an analysis based on the economic/noneconomic distinction, con-
sider the traditional exclusion of Congress from regulating marriage. Congress 
could be excluded on the ground that marriage is a noneconomic activity. Mar-
riage, however, significantly affects the ownership of property, the taxation of 
goods and income, the division of labor, and the wealth of most couples. Con-
sequently, income and wealth are important motives for some people to marry. 
There is also a robust interstate market in goods and services pertaining to 
weddings.  
 
175. Or, to reiterate Chief Justice Marshall’s language in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824), an analysis of collective action should determine whether Congress is 
dealing with “that commerce which concerns more States than one.” See also id. at 195 
(“The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be ap-
plied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect 
the States generally . . . .”). In this sentence, Marshall used the word “generally” as a syn-
onym for the phrase “among the several States.” The theory of collective action federalism 
also ascribes the same meaning to them. 
176. For a related approach to the Commerce Clause, see generally Regan, supra 
note 7. 
177. If Clause 1 continues to be read to prohibit any federal regulation, then we share 
Akhil Amar’s concern that “[w]ithout a broad reading of ‘Commerce’ in [Clause 3], it is not 
entirely clear whence the federal government would derive its needed power to deal with 
noneconomic international incidents—or for that matter to address the entire range of vexing 
nonmercantile interactions and altercations that might arise among states.” AMAR, supra note 
14, at 107-08; see also Balkin, supra note 8, at 1 (“In the eighteenth century . . . , ‘com-
merce’ did not have such narrowly economic connotations. Instead, ‘commerce’ meant ‘in-
tercourse’ and it had a strongly social connotation. ‘Commerce’ was interaction and ex-
change between persons or peoples.”). For further discussion of the relation between Clause 
1 and Clause 3, see infra note 242 and accompanying text.  
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Even if marriage were nonetheless a noneconomic institution or activity, 
the question remains why states are commonly thought to be better situated 
than the federal government to regulate it. The best reason for believing that the 
state governments are more able than the federal government to regulate mar-
riage does not concern its allegedly noneconomic character. Rather, the best 
reason is that regulating marriage does not seem to pose a collective action 
problem for the states. On this view, one state does not appear to free ride on 
another’s law. Nor does one state hold out against harmonizing marriage laws 
in order to obtain better terms from other states. Nor do state marriage laws im-
pede or have aggregative effects on the interstate market for wedding gowns. In 
the absence of interstate externalities or impediments to interstate markets, de-
centralized decision-making does not pose a collective action problem.  
To sensibly limit federal power, a line of reasoning based on the paucity of 
collective action problems seems more promising than a line of reasoning 
based on the economic/noneconomic distinction. We cannot, however, fully 
explore the arguments here. In particular, we cannot discuss the extent to which 
nationalizing marriage law would remove impediments to interstate labor mo-
bility, nor can we examine harmonization in marriage laws178 or whether all 
marriages recognized by one state must be recognized by other states.179 We 
also do not address the analytically distinct question of whether state marriage 
laws violate the federal constitutional rights of individuals.180 
B. Dormant Commerce Clause 
In contrast to the post-1937 Court, which often (explicitly or implicitly) 
recognized the existence of collective action problems among the states in 
upholding congressional regulation, the Rehnquist Court twice perceived the 
 
178. We have in mind the fact that differences in state laws complicate custody dis-
putes, wills, and trusts. A federal system requires balancing harmonization through centrali-
zation and diversity through decentralization. 
179. We have in mind the full-faith-and-credit questions potentially implicated by the 
issue of gay marriage.  
180. Discrimination historically occurred against racial intermarriage. See, e.g., Naim v. 
Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (dismissing a challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute 
despite the statute’s incompatibility with the equal protection principles first articulated in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). When the legitimacy of Brown was 
more secure, the Court unanimously invalidated the Virginia law as a violation of equal pro-
tection and due process. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Today, discrimination occurs 
against same-sex marriages. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986), announcing a right of sexual privacy in the home that extends to homo-
sexuals. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). The Court explicitly put aside the issue of gay marriage 
without explaining why or how it was distinguishable. See id. If the Court followed to its 
logical conclusion its defense of the dignity of intimate homosexual relationships and the 
state’s lack of authority to demean homosexuals, see id. at 560, 567, 575, 578, prohibitions 
of gay marriage would almost certainly violate equal protection. For a discussion, see Siegel, 
supra note 153. 
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absence of a collective action problem among the states as impugning congres-
sional regulation. A third type of case—implicating the so-called dormant 
Commerce Clause181—occurs when a collective action problem allows a state 
to pass a law that harms businesses or individuals in other states. In these cases, 
a state regulation typically conveys a competitive advantage to in-state produc-
ers or users. The Court invalidates state laws that advantage in-state producers 
or users by impeding interstate commerce. The dormant Commerce Clause al-
most always prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce or 
placing an undue burden on the interstate movement of goods and services. In 
international trade, economists regard tariffs as favoring domestic producers at 
the expense of foreign producers and domestic consumers. This analysis of in-
ternational trade applies to the behavior of states in most dormant Commerce 
Clause cases. 
The Court has inferred the existence of the dormant Commerce Clause 
from the role that state protectionism played in inspiring the Constitutional 
Convention,182 as well as from the grant of legislative power to Congress in 
Clause 3. Although the idea that state and local governments are capable of vi-
olating the Commerce Clause is difficult to defend textually, such a constitu-
tional principle is sound from a structural and consequentialist perspective. A 
collective action problem is at the core of any regulation by a state that benefits 
its inhabitants less than it harms inhabitants of other states.183  
There are many examples in the U.S. Reports of these kinds of collective 
action problems.184 We will not attempt a comprehensive or historical treat-
ment of the doctrine; rather, we will offer an illustration. In H.P. Hood & Sons, 
Inc. v. Du Mond, Justice Jackson wrote for the Court that “the established in-
terdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of protecting inter-
state movement of goods against local burdens and repressions.”185 In that 
case, a New York law prevented a company from building an additional depot 
for receiving milk. The effect of the law was to retain more milk for consump-
tion in New York at the expense of consumers in Massachusetts. The Court in-
 
181. Chief Justice Marshall came up with the term in his opinion in Willson v. Black-
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).  
182. See, e.g., supra note 130; infra note 187. 
183. A basic exercise in microeconomics involves proving that the benefits from re-
stricting trade in various ways are less than the costs. 
184. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (prohibiting New York and 
Michigan from discriminating against certain out-of-state wineries). 
185. 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949) (emphasis added). Justice Jackson continued: 
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall 
be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the 
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by cus-
toms duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free 
competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. 
Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has giv-
en it reality. 
Id. at 539. 
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validated the law for lacking a permissible nonprotectionist purpose. In general, 
collective action problems justify the Court’s distinction there and elsewhere 
between state protectionism, which is almost always unconstitutional,186 and 
health and safety regulations, which are often permissible exercises of a state’s 
police powers.187 States may not advantage their industries by protectionist 
regulations, but states may disadvantage their industries in interstate competi-
tion by imposing higher health and safety standards.188  
C. The General Welfare Clause 
1. The purposes for which Congress may tax and spend 
In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, the Court upheld the federal unemploy-
ment compensation system created by the SSA.189 In Helvering v. Davis, the 
Court upheld the SSA’s old age pension program.190 In both cases, the Court 
based its decision in part on a collective action problem involving more than 
one state—specifically, the problem of destructive interstate competition dis-
cussed above. Justice Cardozo wrote for the Court in Steward Machine: 
But if states had been holding back before the passage of the federal law, inac-
tion was not owing, for the most part, to the lack of sympathetic interest. 
Many held back through alarm lest, in laying such a toll upon their industries, 
they would place themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as com-
pared with neighbors or competitors. Two consequences ensued. One was that 
the freedom of a state to contribute its fair share to the solution of a national 
problem was paralyzed by fear. The other was that in so far as there was fail-
ure by the states to contribute relief according to the measure of their capacity, 
a disproportionate burden, and a mountainous one, was laid upon the resources 
of the Government of the nation.191 
 
186. For a seminal interpretation of the case law, see generally Donald H. Regan, The 
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).  
187. H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 533 (“This distinction between the power of the 
State to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety and from fraud, even when 
those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or 
constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted in 
both our history and our law.”); id. at 535 (“This Court consistently has rebuffed attempts of 
states to advance their own commercial interests by curtailing the movement of articles of 
commerce, either into or out of the state, while generally supporting their right to impose 
even burdensome regulations in the interest of local health and safety.”).  
188. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), the Court rejected the sub-
mission that economic protectionism is justified when it is done for the sake of the health of 
the beneficiaries. Justice Cardozo wrote for a unanimous Court that such an exception would 
“eat up the rule,” and that the Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of 
the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salva-
tion are in union and not division.” Id. at 523. 
189. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).  
190. 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
191. Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 588 (citations and footnote omitted).  
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As evidence for a collective action problem, Justice Cardozo noted a Massa-
chusetts bill that would remain inoperative unless the federal bill became law or 
eleven states from a list of twenty-one states “impose[d] on their employers 
burdens substantially equivalent.”192  
Justice Cardozo also wrote for the Court in Helvering, and again he pointed 
to a collective action problem among the states: 
Apart from the failure of resources, states and local governments are at times 
reluctant to increase so heavily the burden of taxation to be borne by their res-
idents for fear of placing themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as 
compared with neighbors or competitors. We have seen this in our study of the 
problem of unemployment compensation. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis. A 
system of old age pensions has special dangers of its own, if put in force in 
one state and rejected in another. The existence of such a system is a bait to 
the needy and dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a 
haven of repose. Only a power that is national can serve the interests of all.193 
Note that federal unemployment compensation and old age pensions promote 
labor mobility among the states by creating rights that a worker takes with her 
when she moves. In contrast to the United States, local provisions for unem-
ployment and old age pensions in Europe create impediments to labor mobility, 
so the European Union has not reached its goal of a single labor market.194  
Cardozo gave notice that the Court would defer to Congress’ determination 
that taxing and spending advances the general welfare “unless the choice is 
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”195 
Perhaps implicitly suggesting how the Court might make that determination, he 
returned to collective action problems by insisting that “the concept of the gen-
eral welfare” is not “static.” On the contrary, “[n]eeds that were narrow or pa-
rochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the 
Nation.”196 Cardozo’s use of “interwoven” echoes Jackson’s use of “interde-
 
192. Id. at 588 n.9. 
193. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644 (citation omitted).  
194. One author observes: 
In social policies the European Union has much less of a record. One of its main concerns 
has been the removal of barriers to labor mobility, the free flow of people to jobs in other 
countries. In practice, labor mobility remains severely curtailed by language diversity and 
great variations in national social security systems. It is still very difficult for people who 
move to other member states to transfer the collective old-age pension rights they have 
earned in their country of origin. This “nontransferability” of social security rights, in partic-
ular of old-age pension rights, is called the “pension gap.” In contrast to practice in most 
member states, the European Union’s social policies have not included any active employ-
ment policies.  
SLOMP, supra note 115, at 127. 
195. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640. The Court has taken this approach ever since. See, e.g., 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (“In considering whether a particular ex-
penditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to 
the judgment of Congress.”). 
196. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641. 
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pendence,”197 which echoes Marshall’s use of “intermingled.”198 
2. Regulation under Clause 1? 
The theory of collective action federalism conceives the “general Welfare” 
as substantively defined by collective action problems involving more than one 
state. This interpretation suggests that it is time to revisit the Butler Court’s re-
jection of the possibility that the General Welfare Clause allows some federal 
regulation in addition to taxation and spending.199 To begin with, the text of 
Clause 1 should not end the conversation; notwithstanding what generations of 
lawyers have been taught in law school, the Clause does not clearly include 
taxation and spending while excluding regulation. The relevant language grants 
Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”200 The 
Clause thus ends the requisition practice that existed under the Articles of Con-
federation,201 and authorizes Congress to use federal tax revenue to pay nation-
al debts and “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States.” One way to “provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States” is to spend federal money on public goods. 
Another way to achieve this objective is by spending federal money to enact, 
administer, and enforce federal regulations. Neither expenditures on public 
goods nor expenditures on regulations are explicitly mentioned in the text of 
Clause 1. It is not clear or obvious from the text that Clause 1 authorizes sup-
plying public goods or prohibits imposing regulations.202  
 
197. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra notes 57, 157, and accompanying text. 
199. Lest our suggestion be dismissed as implausible, we note that what counts as a 
plausible constitutional argument can change dramatically over time. Recently, for example, 
the Court radically changed the longstanding judicial understanding of the Second Amend-
ment. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (holding for the first 
time in American history that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess 
a firearm—including a handgun—unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that fire-
arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home), with Reva B. 
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 191, 224 (2008) (reproducing Chief Justice Warren Burger’s 1991 statement that the 
individual rights view of the Second Amendment is “the subject of one of the greatest pieces 
of fraud, I repeat the word ‘fraud,’ on the American public by special interest groups that I 
have ever seen in my lifetime,” and Judge Robert Bork’s 1989 statement that the Amend-
ment “guarantee[s] the right of states to form militia, not for individuals to bear arms” and 
that state gun control legislation is “probably constitutional” (citations omitted)). The Ro-
berts Court has further held that the right declared in Heller binds state and local govern-
ments. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
201. See supra Part I. 
202. Notably, Madison did not reject the idea of regulatory power under Clause 1 as 
textually impossible based on a plain reading of Clause 1. See supra note 37. If anything, 
Madison discounted the importance of the distinction between regulation and expenditure. 
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Further, the theory of collective action federalism ameliorates the 
longstanding concern about a general federal police power by imbuing the 
phrase “general Welfare” with substantive meaning. We offer a rationale for 
federal power to address problems of collective action among the states when 
the other clauses of Section 8 are unavailable. We do not provide a justification 
for Congress to regulate whatever it wants under Clause 1.  
Moreover, under our approach, allowing some forms of regulation under 
Clause 1 does not render the rest of Section 8 superfluous. On the contrary, 
when Article I, Section 8 is interpreted according to the theory of collective ac-
tion federalism, the enumerated powers constitute a coherent response to a se-
ries of collective action problems, not a diverse collection of unrelated powers. 
Coherence comes from the conceptual link between the specific powers and 
collective action problems affecting the general welfare. It is the enumeration 
of the specific powers in the balance of Section 8 that imbues the inherently 
vague phrase “general Welfare” with definite meaning. That is the primary 
purpose of the enumeration; the purpose is not to exclude everything not enu-
merated.203 
Even if the foregoing arguments are deemed insufficient to displace the 
conventional understanding of the constitutional text, it does not necessarily 
follow that Clause 1 does not authorize regulation. Also relevant to the proper 
construction of the clause is the fact that many economists advocate externality 
taxes as the most effective way to accomplish regulatory objectives, such as 
taxes on air and water pollution. A federal price on pollution can be construed 
as a tax or a regulation. The two may be materially equivalent.204 The tenuous 
 
See BREST ET AL., supra note 5, at 83 (“A restriction of the power ‘to provide for the com-
mon defense and general welfare’ to cases which are to be provided for by the expenditure of 
money would still leave within legislative power of Congress all the great and most impor-
tant measures of Government, money being the ordinary and necessary means of carrying 
them into execution.” (quoting Madison, supra note 50, at 585)). 
203. Cf. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE 
MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 119 (2005) (“There is much to be said for the 
position that the listed powers [in Article I, Section 8] were not intended to be exclu-
sive . . . .”). Calvin Johnson writes:  
[T]he best legal maxim of interpretation for the list of powers in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution is not expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one excludes all oth-
ers), but rather ejusdem generic, meaning that unstated items covered by a general standard 
must be of the same class as the enumerated items, but the enumerated items are not exclu-
sive. The list of powers is illustrative. Indeed they may be campaign promises of what the 
Framers really wanted to do quickly. But they are not exhaustive of what the Congress could 
do within the appropriately national sphere.  
Id. at 122 (footnote omitted). According to Johnson, “[t]he broadest statement of the prin-
ciple of federal jurisdiction is the power ‘to provide for the common Defense and general 
Welfare’ in clause 1 of the Constitution’s description of the powers of Congress.” Id. 
204. The Court at one point distinguished impermissible “regulatory” taxes from per-
missible “revenue raising” taxes. See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax 
Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922). But the Court has long since abandoned that doctrine as resting 
on a false distinction and as not grounded in the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Ka-
hriger, 345 U.S. 22, 31 (1953) (“Unless there are provisions extraneous to any tax need, 
COOTER AND SIEGEL 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2010 12:57 PM 
172 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:115 
economic distinction between many taxes and regulations, which we will ana-
lyze in future work, suggests that allowing one and not the other under Clause 1 
makes little sense. Exploring the forms of regulation permitted under Clause 1 
is a task that we leave for a subsequent article.205 
More concretely, when Congress wants to address a problem of collective 
action involving multiple states, the specific clause of Section 8 that it may use 
under our approach depends on the nature of the problem. If no clause in Sec-
tion 8 authorizes Congress to address a collective action problem involving 
more than one state, then the General Welfare Clause remains available to 
Congress. Collective action federalism reads Section 8 as authorizing Congress 
to address problems of collective action that the states are unable to solve.206  
To illustrate, consider situations in which Congress seeks to regulate argu-
ably noneconomic activities that spill environmental harms across state borders. 
When the regulated activity crosses state boundaries, the federal courts are lax 
about its being “economic.” Thus, environmental pollution and endangered 
species that cross state lines are apparently understood to fall within the com-
merce power, even though they are not commerce and may have very atte-
nuated effects on commerce.207 Congress may regulate the interstate movement 
of, say, naturally occurring arsenic in water that crosses state lines through an 
underground aquifer or nonnavigable stream.208 And Congress may regulate 
 
courts are without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing power.”); Sonzinsky v. United 
States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937) (“Every tax is in some measure regulatory. . . . But [it] 
is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect . . . . Inquiry into the hidden mo-
tives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is 
beyond the competency of courts.”).  
205. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Taxes, Regulations, and Health Care: Part 
II of Collective Action Federalism (Sept. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
authors). A relevant question we do not explore here is whether federal regulatory power 
under Clause 1 should be unavailable when Congress is barred from taxing the states by the 
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. 
206. To the extent that Clause 1 authorizes federal regulation, it follows that Congress 
need not invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify federal regulation of noneconom-
ic activity on the ground that it affects economic activity. Rather, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause would serve as a reminder of the breadth of federal power in Section 8 to address col-
lective action problems, economic or otherwise. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
207. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the 
Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Lim-
its of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 724 (2002) (“While the Court’s Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence is ultimately more concerned with the impacts of activities upon 
interstate commerce than the activities’ location, most judges and commentators have as-
sumed that whether a species is located in only one state or crosses state boundaries is an 
important factor.” (footnotes omitted)). But see John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause 
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 185 n.49 (1998) (“Why 
the fact that a bird or animal crosses state lines of its own volition and without being itself an 
object of interstate commerce is sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes remains unex-
plained.”). 
208. The airshed is easier to defend as a channel of interstate commerce because air is 
undifferentiated and airplanes fly through it at nearly all altitudes.  
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activities just because they threaten the existence of a species that moves across 
state boundaries.209 These examples are unequivocally interstate in the sense 
that material harms are spilling across state borders, but the nexus to commerce 
is attenuated or nonexistent. Decisional law endorses the principle that Con-
gress may regulate interstate pollution and interstate endangered species as if 
they were commerce, and we know of none that casts doubt on it.210  
We have explained that when the regulated activity is interstate in the sense 
that it spills across state borders, courts are undemanding about its being eco-
nomic. Conversely, as we showed in Part I.B.2, when the regulated activity is 
deemed economic, courts are undemanding about its being interstate. The Court 
simply presumes that economic activity has substantial effects on interstate 
commerce and that noneconomic activity does not. In short, the federal judi-
ciary has construed the Interstate Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 as if 
it were the Interstate or Commerce Clause.  
This could change, however, if the Roberts Court continues to build Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence on the economic/noneconomic distinction. What is 
presently uncontroversial may not always remain so.211 In time, the Court may 
find that Congress lacks the power to regulate interstate pollution and interstate 
endangered species unless they have a causal nexus with commerce. Environ-
mental harms may spill across state borders, but their causes and effects may or 
may not be economic or commercial as the Supreme Court has conceived these 
terms.  
Unlike the Commerce Clause, the General Welfare Clause does not require 
a distinction between economic and noneconomic welfare. Regardless of 
whether it is economic in its cause or effect, air pollution, water pollution, and 
endangered species that move between states constitute an interstate externali-
ty. Under the theory of collective action federalism, Congress may target them 
when they pose a collective action problem.  
 
209. See William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution: 
SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10741, 10766-67 (2001) (“[W]hen one seeks the 
authority for plenary congressional authority over interstate waters per se or to regulate in-
terstate pollution simply by reason of its being interstate, one seeks in vain. . . . Congress’ 
power to legislate must be grounded in its enumerated powers and does not extend to . . . 
interstate waters . . . except as any such legislation is otherwise based on the enumerated 
powers.”).  
210. See id. at 10761-62, 10765 (compiling case citations and quotations). This problem 
has been around for a long time. “Curiously enough,” Robert Stern wrote in the Harvard 
Law Review in 1934, “the cases most out of harmony with the historical approach to the 
commerce clause are not those holding federal legislation invalid, but those upholding feder-
al statutes regulating movements across state lines where no true ‘commerce’ was present at 
all. The fact that automobile thieves or persons bent on private immorality cross state lines 
does not render their activity commercial.” Stern, supra note 26, at 1355.  
211. Cf. Funk, supra note 209, at 10771 (“The larger question raised by a stricter scru-
tiny of the Commerce Clause basis for environmental legislation . . . is the extent to which 
the Court will reconsider, or consider for the first time, assumptions that have underlain en-
vironmental legislation and its judicial review for one-quarter century.”). 
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 For example, the touchstone of federal authority for five Justices in Rapa-
nos v. United States was interstate navigable waters.212 But lots of water that 
flows across state boundaries is nonnavigable, and some of this water presuma-
bly lacks a significant nexus to interstate navigable waters. If federal authority 
were triggered by an interstate externality—as it would be under our interpreta-
tion of the General Welfare Clause—the movement across a state line could 
justify federal action. The crucial fact would be a spillover of welfare and a col-
lective action problem, not a significant nexus to interstate navigable waters.213 
To consider another example, the extinction of an endangered species 
harms the future well-being of people in all states where the species might oth-
erwise live. Thus an activity in state A may extinguish a species in states A, B, 
and C. Moreover, whether the harmful activity is the construction of a housing 
development or the recreational use of land by local residents makes no differ-
ence for purposes of the general welfare. The same can be said of interstate 
drinking water that has been contaminated by naturally occurring arsenic in-
stead of an industrial polluter. In either case, federal action can internalize the 
externality. The federal government, therefore, potentially enjoys a decisive 
 
212. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), concerned a fight over wetlands 
endangered by economic development. The question presented was whether wetlands adja-
cent to nonnavigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters were part of “the waters of 
the United States” within the meaning of the Federal Clean Water Act (CWA), see infra note 
221. The plurality concluded that the term “navigable waters” in the CWA includes “only 
relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,” not “intermittent or ephemeral 
flow[s].” Id. at 732-34. It further concluded that “only those wetlands with a continuous sur-
face connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, so that 
there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands, are ‘adjacent to’ such waters 
and covered by the Act.” Id. at 742. The plurality invoked federalism concerns and constitu-
tional avoidance. Id. at 737-38. 
By contrast, Justice Kennedy concluded that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had 
both statutory and constitutional authority to regulate wetlands that are adjacent to nonnavig-
able tributaries of traditional navigable waters so long as the wetlands “possess a ‘significant 
nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.” Id. 
at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167, 172 (2001)). In his controlling opinion, 
Kennedy did not specify what the “significant nexus” test requires, but he did emphasize that 
the Corps must establish substantial ecological connections between the wetlands and tradi-
tionally navigable waters, regardless of the existence of hydrologic connections. Id. at 778-
87. In practice, this requirement should allow robust federal protection of wetlands. Kennedy 
wrote that his interpretation of the CWA “does not raise federalism or Commerce Clause 
concerns sufficient to support a presumption against its adoption.” Id. at 782. While conced-
ing that his “significant-nexus requirement may not align perfectly with the traditional extent 
of federal authority,” he wrote that “in most cases regulation of wetlands that are adjacent to 
tributaries and possess a significant nexus with navigable waters will raise no serious consti-
tutional or federalism difficulty.” Id. 
213. While it is important to distinguish between questions of statutory interpretation—
for example, the meaning of “navigable waters” in the CWA—and issues of constitutional 
authority, it is also true that the former often takes place in the shadow of the latter. For ex-
ample, the previous note makes clear that the Justices in Rapanos were partially motivated 
by constitutional concerns.  
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advantage over the states in addressing the problem of preserving species or 
combating pollutants that move interstate. Justifying federal pursuit of the gen-
eral welfare would extend at least some forms of federal regulation to instances 
of environmental degradation without notably economic characteristics that in-
volve collective action problems. 
3. When to avoid avoidance 
An advantage of collective active federalism is that it will discourage 
courts from construing federal statutes narrowly in ways that exacerbate collec-
tive action problems. Lopez and Morrison are the only cases in which the 
Rehnquist Court invalidated federal laws on Commerce Clause grounds. In 
other cases, however, the Court limited congressional power in a different way: 
it construed federal statutes narrowly. A narrow construction limits how much 
Congress can do under the statute, thereby easing “constitutional doubts” re-
garding whether Congress has exceeded the commerce power. Construing a 
statute narrowly to avoid constitutional doubts is a well-established practice in 
certain areas of constitutional law. The Rehnquist Court extended this practice 
to Commerce Clause challenges—including, unfortunately, to cases implicating 
collective action problems.  
The first avoidance decision came in Jones v. United States.214 Federal law 
criminalized arson or attempted arson of “any building . . . used in interstate or 
foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce.”215 Jones presented the question of whether arson of a private residence 
violated this statute and, if so, whether the statute was therefore unconstitution-
al. The federal government argued that the dwelling was “used” in activities 
affecting interstate commerce because the homeowner secured a mortgage from 
an Oklahoma lender, bought casualty insurance from a Wisconsin insurer, and 
used natural gas from outside Indiana.216  
The Court unanimously construed the statute not to apply to arson of a pri-
vate residence. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that the statute’s “used in” 
requirement “is most sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial 
purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connection to com-
merce.”217 Having construed the statue narrowly, the Court did not have to de-
cide its constitutionality. Justice Ginsburg stated that the Court’s reading “is in 
harmony with the guiding principle that where a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise 
and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the 
 
214. 529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
215. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006). 
216. Jones, 529 U.S. at 855. 
217. Id. 
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latter.”218 Specifically, she wrote that in light of Lopez, “it is appropriate to 
avoid the constitutional question that would arise were we to read [the law] to 
render the traditionally local criminal conduct in which petitioner Jones en-
gaged a matter for federal enforcement.”219  
We would add that state control over arson laws—whether they are applied 
to arson of a commercial enterprise or of a private residence—does not seem to 
cause a collective action problem. Different rates of arson in different states 
may have some effect on the price residents pay for mortgages, insurance, or 
gas. These effects, however, do not allow one state to externalize its costs to 
another. In controlling arson, one state does not have an incentive to free ride 
on the laws of a neighboring state. Nor does one state try to extract concessions 
from another state by threatening to reduce sanctions against arsonists. The 
federal law apparently did not address a collective action problem, so con-
struing it narrowly (or invalidating it) limits federal power, as the theory of col-
lective action federalism commends.  
By contrast, federal laws protecting the environment often address inter-
state externalities, so construing these statutes narrowly can aggravate a collec-
tive action problem. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) 
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers was such a case.220 A consortium of 
Chicago suburbs sought to purchase a gravel pit filled with water and used by 
migratory birds. The buyers wished to drain and convert it for disposal of solid 
wastes. Section 404(a) of the Federal Clean Water Act (CWA)221 regulates the 
discharge of dredged or fill material into “navigable waters,” which the Act de-
fines as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”222 The 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) had promulgated rules regarding the applica-
bility of the CWA. One of them, the Migratory Bird Rule,223 required com-
pliance with the CWA for waters used by migratory birds. The case arose when 
the Corps applied the Migratory Bird Rule to the gravel pit. The United States 
defended the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird Rule on the ground that 
 
218. Id. at 857 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
219. Id. at 858 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
220. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
221. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act) 
§ 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).  
222. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006). 
223. Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (stating that section 
404(a) extends to intrastate waters: “a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds pro-
tected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other mi-
gratory birds which cross state lines; or c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endan-
gered species; or d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce”); see also SWANCC, 
531 U.S. at 164 (quoting the Migratory Bird Rule). The Migratory Bird Rule clarified a fed-
eral regulation issued by the Corps to define a key statutory term in the CWA. See 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(a)(3) (2010) (defining “waters of the United States” to include “waters such as in-
trastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, 
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation 
or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce”).  
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“protection of migratory birds is a national interest of very nearly the first mag-
nitude,” and that “millions of people spend over a billion dollars annually on 
recreational pursuits relating to migratory birds.”224 
The Court fractured in the same way that it did in Lopez and Morrison, 
holding 5-4 that the CWA did not apply to intrastate waters used as habitat by 
migratory birds. Having decided that the statute did not apply to the case at bar, 
the Court did not have to decide its constitutionality. Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist underscored the “significant constitutional questions” 
avoided by the Court, for “[p]ermitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction 
over ponds and mudflats falling within the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ would result 
in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over 
land and water use.”225 To the extent that there is no political will in Congress 
to amend the statute to include what the Court held was excluded, the Court’s 
decision proves as decisive as a holding of unconstitutionality.226  
In stark contrast to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens wrote a dissent 
that follows the theory of collective action federalism: 
The destruction of aquatic migratory bird habitat, like so many other environ-
mental problems, is an action in which the benefits (e.g., a new landfill) are 
disproportionately local, while many of the costs (e.g., fewer migratory birds) 
are widely dispersed and often borne by citizens living in other States. In such 
situations, described by economists as involving “externalities,” federal regu-
lation is both appropriate and necessary.227 
 
224. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
225. Id. at 174. 
226. As one of our colleagues has noted:  
Environmental legislation has become politically divisive. At a time when political institu-
tions are themselves closely divided, the prospects are not bright for enacting contentious 
legislation sure to produce well-organized losers, which such wetlands legislation certainly 
would be. . . . As a practical political matter, SWANCC removes the federal government from 
this area as surely as a holding of unconstitutionality would . . . . [T]he shadow that 
SWANCC’s clear statement interpretive rule casts is much more ominous than the shadow 
Lopez and Morrison together have cast over the theoretical reach of federal authority under 
the Commerce Clause. 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Environmental Law, Congress, and the Court’s New Federalism 
Doctrine, 78 IND. L.J. 413, 455, 457 (2003). The political situation in Washington, D.C., ob-
viously has changed significantly since 2003, but this does not mean Congress will now pro-
vide the clear statement that the SWANCC Court held was required—particularly in light of 
the Senate’s rules and the present composition of the Court. 
227. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens invoked the 
reasoning of Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), where the state 
sued to stop a federal game warden from enforcing the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 
and associated regulations, arguing that the law violated the Tenth Amendment, id. at 430-
31. Writing for the Court, Holmes rejected the appeal to state sovereignty: 
 Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected 
only by national action in concert with that of another power. The subject-matter is only tran-
sitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the sta-
tute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the Consti-
tution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors 
of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the States. The re-
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Birds have nonmarket value that spills across jurisdictions as they migrate. Pro-
tecting birds thus combines an externality problem and a problem of collective 
action. Many localities destroy animal habitat for profit and hope that other lo-
calities will preserve it. When federal law addresses a collective action problem 
involving multiple states, construing the law narrowly could aggravate the 
problem. Moving the constitutional justification for the law from Clause 3 to 
Clause 1 renders a narrowing construction unnecessary. If Lopez, Morrison, 
and Raich were rightly decided, then SWANCC was wrongly decided. 
The theory of collective action federalism focuses the interpretive commu-
nity on the issue that really matters to lawmakers and citizens: the environmen-
tal impact of the harmful activity upon the general welfare, not the effect on in-
terstate economic activity. In the environmental context, debate over whether a 
regulated activity is economic distracts attention from the central constitutional 
question of whether welfare is general or particular. So do arguments about 
whether Congress “really” wanted to regulate economic activity or whether its 
commerce justification is pretextual.228 For example, the relationship between 
water pollution and economic activity distracts attention from the question of 
how clean water promotes the general welfare of the United States. A debate on 
that point should result in a more straightforward defense of federal authority, 
aligning better with common-sense reasoning.  
The same could be said of the justification for federal regulation in other 
settings. Consider, for example, the control of contagious diseases. The federal 
government might want to impose regulations to prevent the spread of a conta-
gious disease across state lines—say, by authorizing federal officials to quaran-
tine infected individuals or to close local schools in defined and temporally li-
mited circumstances. This would not qualify as a regulation of economic 
activity in any obvious or straightforward sense (even though here, as else-
where, one could invoke substantial effects on interstate commerce in the ag-
gregate).229 Yet in light of potentially large spillover effects impinging the gen-
eral welfare, Congress ought to possess this power without having to condition 
related federal funds on compliance. The rationale for allowing federal regula-
 
liance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden to 
act. 
Id. at 435 (emphasis added). 
228. Our concern is with the distracting quality of the “pretext” debate in many settings. 
Our point is not that allegations of pretext have force, so that Congress may regulate inter-
state commerce only for certain purposes and not others. Compare, e.g., William Van Als-
tyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the Cellophane 
Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 797-99 (arguing for the invigoration of pretext doctrine in Com-
merce Clause cases), with Schroeder, supra note 226, at 443-45 (critically analyzing Van 
Alstyne’s view).  
229. One could also attempt to justify federal regulation in this hypothetical by invok-
ing the current doctrine’s broad approval of congressional regulation of persons in interstate 
commerce. See supra text accompanying note 73. It is not clear, however, why individuals 
subject to a federal quarantine would necessarily qualify as persons in interstate commerce. 
COOTER AND SIEGEL 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2010 12:57 PM 
December 2010] COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM 179 
tion of this powerful noneconomic externality under the General Welfare 
Clause is straightforward and compelling. 
The Court implicitly adopted the logic of collective action in its recent de-
cision in United States v. Comstock.230 The question presented was whether 
Congress has the power under Article I, Section 8 to authorize the United States 
Department of Justice to civilly commit a mentally ill, sexually dangerous fed-
eral prisoner after the completion of his federal sentence if no state will accept 
custody of the prisoner. In holding 7-2 that Congress possesses such authority, 
the Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer, relied in part on the 
fact that the case implicated a collective action problem involving more than 
one state. After the sentence of a sexually dangerous prisoner has expired, the 
federal government might release him in any number of states—for example, 
the state where he had been tried, or the state where he is presently domiciled. 
A state that agrees to assume custody of the individual internalizes significant 
financial costs associated with indefinite civil commitment and externalizes the 
social benefits of committing the individual, who might otherwise travel inter-
state upon release. The Court showcased unsurprising evidence that states often 
refuse to assume custody, presumably hoping that another state will blink 
first.231 To be sure, the Court relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause to jus-
tify this assertion of federal power, not the General Welfare Clause, as would 
be our inclination. The key analytical point, however, is that the Court and the 
Justices concurring in the judgment implicitly stressed the relationship between 
the federal statute at bar and the general welfare, understood in terms of collec-
tive action problems that the federal government is better situated to address 
than the states.232  
In his biography of the Constitution, Akhil Amar criticizes the Supreme 
 
230. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1961-62 (2010).  
231. Id. at 1959 (quoting a 1945 report of the Judicial Conference of the United States 
finding that “States would not accept an ‘appreciable number’ of ‘mental[ly] incompetent’ 
individuals ‘nearing expiration’ of their prison terms, because of their ‘lack of legal resi-
dence in any State,’ even though those individuals ‘ought not . . . be at large because they 
constitute a menace to public safety’”); id. at 1961 (“Congress could . . . have reasonably 
concluded (as detailed in the Judicial Conference’s report) that a reasonable number of such 
individuals would likely not be detained by the States if released from federal custody, in 
part because the Federal Government itself severed their claim to legal residence in any State 
by incarcerating them in remote federal prisons.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
232. See id.; id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“Federal prisoners often 
lack a single home State to take charge of them due to their lengthy prison stays, so it is in-
cumbent on the National Government to act.”); id. at 1969 (Alito, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (“The statute recognizes that, in many cases, no State will assume the heavy financial 
burden of civilly committing a dangerous federal prisoner who, as a result of lengthy federal 
incarceration, no longer has any substantial ties to any State.”); id. at 1970 (“These federal 
prisoners, having been held for years in a federal prison, often had few ties to any State; it 
was a matter of speculation where they would choose to go upon release; and accordingly no 
State was enthusiastic about volunteering to shoulder the burden of civil commitment.”). In 
dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dismissed this rationale as “implausible” 
and, in any event, as constitutionally irrelevant. Id. at 1980-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Court’s “move[ment] toward reading the [Commerce Clause] paragraph as ap-
plicable only to economic interactions,” arguing that “[w]ithout a broad reading 
of ‘Commerce’ in this clause, it is not entirely clear whence the federal gov-
ernment would derive its needed power to deal with noneconomic international 
incidents—or for that matter to address the entire range of vexing nonmercan-
tile interactions and altercations that might arise among states.”233 There may 
be an independent way: under our interpretation of Article I, Section 8, Con-
gress possesses some authority under Clause 1 to regulate noneconomic collec-
tive action problems involving multiple states.234 
V. EVALUATING CONGRESSIONAL JUDGMENTS ABOUT COLLECTIVE 
ACTION PROBLEMS 
Because people disagree about the appropriate scope of federal power, they 
will disagree about how constitutional interpreters, particularly courts, should 
evaluate congressional judgments about the existence and seriousness of collec-
tive action problems, and about the adequacy of Congress’s response. Because 
Congress can always seek to justify legislation by asserting that a collective ac-
tion problem exists, that its effects are significant, and that the law it has 
enacted addresses the problem effectively, the evaluative question becomes 
what degree of proof courts should require of Congress before they will defer 
to its judgment. We do not seek to resolve disagreements over this question in 
this Article, but we can illustrate one form that judicial review could take.  
Many people believe that Congress possesses broad but not limitless au-
thority to legislate under Section 8. This belief is reflected in the interpretive 
principle of loose construction first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall for the 
 
233. AMAR, supra note 14, at 107-08; see also Regan, supra note 7, at 564-65 (“[E]ven 
if we are faithful to the spirit of the sixth Virginia Resolution and believe in genuine limits 
on federal power, we are forced to construe some clause in Article I, Section 8 in a not fully 
literal way to fill up the gap between the enumeration of specific powers and the current 
needs of the national system. An expansive reading of the Commerce Clause is what we 
have mainly relied on to fill this gap.”). 
234. We also flag another potential basis for addressing interstate problems that are 
deemed both to be beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause and to require federal regula-
tion. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” not only “the foregoing 
Powers,” but also “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. These other powers include the “judicial Power 
of the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, and the “judicial Power” extends to “Contro-
versies between two or more States,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Accordingly, it might suffice 
to justify federal regulation of an interstate problem on the ground that a rational, means-
ends relationship exists between such regulation and the federal judiciary’s execution of its 
responsibility to resolve controversies between at least two states. Such a rational relation-
ship might exist if federal regulation obviated the need for judicial intervention. We note, but 
do not develop, this possible constitutional “hook” for federal regulation of noneconomic 
problems of collective action involving more than one state. 
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Court in McCulloch v. Maryland235 and recently reaffirmed by a majority of 
Justices in United States v. Comstock.236 One possible standard of review is 
whether Congress had a reasonable basis to believe that it was ameliorating a 
significant problem of collective action involving two or more states. If reason-
able people could disagree (1) about the existence of a collective action prob-
lem, (2) about the seriousness of the problem, and (3) about the efficacy of the 
congressional response, then courts should uphold the law. Congress would 
have to offer a basis for its judgments that there is a serious multistate problem 
of collective action and that the law addresses the problem to some extent. 
Courts would defer to plausible findings by Congress. Such an approach to 
judicial review would “cue” the political branches to take seriously those fede-
ralism questions that are worth taking seriously,237 but it would not license fed-
eral courts to engage in Lochner-style invalidations of many federal laws and 
overrulings of precedent. A deferential approach to judicial review would also 
substantially address the objection that the theory of collective action federal-
ism tasks judges with making determinations ill-suited for them.238 Resolution 
 
235. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-07, 421 (1819). For a discussion, see supra note 55 
and accompanying text. 
236. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956-58 (2010). In Comstock, the Justices debated the standard of 
review courts should apply to federal legislation that is defended as resting on the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. The majority consisting of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor stated that “in determining whether the Necessary and 
Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, 
we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the imple-
mentation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” Id. at 1956 (citation omitted). By con-
trast, Justice Kennedy would insist on “a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical dem-
onstration.” Id. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Alito seemed to 
endorse Justice Kennedy’s more demanding standard. Id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
237. See, e.g., Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Un-
steady Path”: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 
1484 (1995) (stressing this function of judicial review in federalism cases); Daniel J. Melt-
zer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 63 (simi-
lar); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1, 51 (similar).  
238. In vetoing an internal improvements bill on constitutional grounds, Madison wor-
ried about “excluding the judicial authority of the United States from its participation in 
guarding the boundary between legislative powers of the General and State Governments, 
inasmuch as questions relating to the general welfare, being questions of policy and expe-
diency, are unsusceptible of judicial cognizance and decision.” BREST ET AL., supra note 5, at 
83 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in 
the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1612, 1647-48, 1677-82 (2002) (critiquing a collective action approach to federalism as con-
trary to the judicial role). The theory of collective action federalism, whether or not it is used 
in judicial review, is similar in important respects to the European principle of “subsidiari-
ty.” See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
795, 831-38 (1996); Mattias Kumm, Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International 
Law: Terms of Engagement, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 256, 264-68 (Su-
jit Choudhry ed., 2006).  
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of the issue of judicial capacity should follow resolution of the issue of consti-
tutional meaning, not the other way around. 
The above illustration leaves several critical questions unanswered or ans-
wered incompletely. In order to establish the existence of a collective action 
problem among the states, does Congress need a plausible rationale, some evi-
dence, or substantial evidence? Would it make sense to use a balancing test, 
such that greater intrusions on the regulatory autonomy of states would require 
greater evidentiary showings from Congress? What is the minimum threshold 
of harm to the general welfare that a collective action problem must cross be-
fore Congress has the constitutional authority to act? When addressing a collec-
tive action problem, does Congress need to adopt the least intrusive means of 
federal intervention?  
To illustrate concretely, if the severity of punishment for the same crime 
differs between two states, then rational criminals have an incentive to commit 
their crimes in the state with milder punishment. Perceiving this fact, states 
might enact severe punishments to deflect crime away from themselves and 
onto others. This interstate externality could cause the states to race towards 
severity, even though all states would benefit from lowering average punish-
ments and reducing the burden on their prisons. Could Congress rely on this 
rationale to federalize all of criminal law? Or would it have to proceed crime by 
crime? Would it have to provide evidence that a race to severity exists and 
causes a large fall in the general welfare? Would it have to show that federaliz-
ing some or all criminal law is the least intrusive federal solution?  
We can raise these questions but we cannot answer them in this Article. 
Answers must await future developments and applications of the theory of col-
lective action federalism in different areas of law. We resist, however, the ob-
jection that the concept of a collective action problem involving two or more 
states is indeterminate—that Congress can, with equal plausibility, justify regu-
lating whatever it wishes on the ground that it is adequately addressing a se-
rious problem of collective action. Some federal laws are substantially easier to 
justify on such grounds than others. Moreover, we are aware of no better alter-
native to understanding the division of power between the federal government 
and the states in Article I, Section 8. For example, the Court’s distinction be-
tween economic and noneconomic activity is neither determinate nor sensible 
for all of the reasons we have identified.  
Most importantly, the indeterminacy objection may presuppose that the 
Constitution is substantially more determinate than it in fact is—that the Con-
stitution authoritatively resolves disagreements, as opposed to organizing and 
orienting them.239 We offer the theory of collective action federalism as the 
 
239. It is a mistake to view the Constitution or constitutional law as fully determinate. 
See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY 
AND POLITICS 6 (2002) (“However counterintuitive it may seem, the integrity and coherence 
of constitutional law are to be found in, not apart from, controversy.”); Robert C. Post & 
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best, all-things-considered interpretation of what Article I, Section 8 means. 
Whether that meaning is fully determinate is a separate question. In our view, it 
is not fully determinate, but neither is it wholly indeterminate.  
CONCLUSION 
A federal constitution ideally gives the central and state governments the 
power to do what each does best. Thinking along these lines about the United 
States Constitution, Alexis de Tocqueville remarked that the “[f]ederal system 
was created with the intention of combining the different advantages which re-
sult from the magnitude and the littleness of nations.”240 To secure these ad-
vantages, according to the internalization principle, a constitution should assign 
power to the smallest unit of government that internalizes the effects of its ex-
ercise.  
By definition, the costs and benefits of interstate public goods, externali-
ties, and markets spill over from one state to another, which creates collective 
action problems for the states. According to the Federal Coase Theorem, states 
could ideally solve the problem of spillovers by bargaining and compacting 
without the intervention of the federal government. Under the Articles of Con-
federation, Americans found that voluntary cooperation among several states 
worked poorly to address these problems. Transaction costs, especially hol-
douts, obstruct cooperation. Solving the problem of interstate externalities and 
markets usually requires majority (or supermajority) rule in the nation, which 
the Constitution embodies in the federal government. The federal government 
is usually the smallest unit that effectively internalizes the benefits and costs of 
interstate public goods, externalities, and markets. Accordingly, the internaliza-
tion principle assigns power over interstate externalities and markets to the fed-
eral government. 
The theory of collective action federalism interprets Article I, Section 8 in 
light of this principle; it views the enumerated powers as a coherent response to 
collective action problems, not a heterogeneous collection of unrelated powers. 
Coherence comes from the connection of the specific powers to collective ac-
tion problems affecting the general welfare. The enumeration of the specific 
powers in the Constitution imbues the inherently vague phrase “general Wel-
fare” in Clause 1 with definite meaning. Welfare is “general” when the federal 
government can obtain it and the states cannot. The states cannot reliably 
achieve an end when doing so requires many (or even as few as two) states to 
cooperate. According to the theory of collective action federalism, Article I, 
 
Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Ac-
tion, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1501 (2007) (“[I]t is 
simply fantasy to imagine that law can be fully determinate or fully autonomous from popu-
lar beliefs.”).  
240. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 206.  
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Section 8 empowers Congress to solve collective action problems that predicta-
bly frustrate the states. In the language of Clause 3, interstate public goods, ex-
ternalities, and markets are “among the several States.” In the language of 
Clause 1, they are “general.”241 Governmental activities that do not pose col-
lective action problems for the states are “internal to a state” or “local.” 
The “general Welfare,” interpreted as part of the enumerated powers, is a 
substantive conception of interstate effects that centers on collective action 
problems. Members of Congress, Presidents, their supporters, and their critics 
should use this framework to understand and debate the constitutional scope of 
Congress’s power to tax, spend, and regulate.  
In 1995, the Court abandoned its longstanding willingness to allow the fed-
eral government to regulate almost any activity by invoking the Commerce 
Clause. The Court has limited the power of Congress by declaring federal sta-
tutes unconstitutional or by construing them narrowly. The Court has purported 
to build a jurisprudence of federalism under Clause 3 on the distinction be-
tween economic activity, which Congress may regulate, and noneconomic ac-
tivity, which Congress may not regulate. Unfortunately, Congress is not gener-
ally better at regulating economic activity, and the states are not generally 
better at regulating noneconomic activity. However adequate it may (or may 
not) be for purposes of defining “Commerce” in Clause 3, the distinction be-
tween economic and noneconomic activity seems mostly irrelevant to the prob-
lems of federalism; it does not explain when an activity exists “among the sev-
eral States” and when it exists within a state.  
A more promising foundation for the American federal system established 
by Article I, Section 8 distinguishes between activities that pose collective ac-
tion problems for the states and those that do not pose such problems. The 
theory of collective action federalism is superior because it flows directly from 
the relative advantages of the federal government and the states. We hope that 
Section 8 will eventually be understood as authorizing congressional power 
over activities that pose collective action problems for the states, and as forbid-
ding congressional power over activities that do not pose collective action 
problems for the states. We also hope that Clause 1 will eventually be unders-
tood to authorize some forms of federal regulation of noneconomic activities 
when states face collective action problems. When Clause 1 assumes some of 
the burden of justifying federal regulation, there is less need to define the word 
“Commerce” in Clause 3 to encompass almost every collective action problem 
warranting congressional action. By thickening “Welfare,” constitutional inter-
pretation can (although need not) thin “Commerce.”242 With these changes, 
 
241. A more complete analysis of constitutional powers would buttress this conclusion. 
See, e.g., COOTER, supra note 104, at 171-239.  
242. Specifically, our thick conception of the “general Welfare” can combine with ei-
ther a thick or a thin understanding of “Commerce.” In the former case, our thick conception 
of the general welfare complements Jack Balkin’s and Akhil Amar’s thick conception of 
commerce, see supra note 177 and accompanying text, because each conception reinforces 
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federal law could then be seen to rest on what often motivates its enactment: its 
promotion of the general welfare, not the economic character of the activity 
that it regulates.243 
 
the other in providing constitutional authorization for regulating commerce. In the latter 
case, our thick conception of the general welfare substitutes for a thin, economic conception 
of commerce by providing an independent basis for regulating noneconomic problems of 
collective action. While we do not choose between a thick and a thin understanding of 
“Commerce,” we do advocate understanding the Commerce Clause and the General Welfare 
Clause in terms of the collective action problems that motivate this part of the Constitution.  
243. The recently enacted health care legislation, Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), has provoked renewed interest in con-
stitutional limits on the federal powers to tax and regulate. One question presently being de-
bated in public discourse and constitutional litigation is whether the provisions in the statute 
concerning compulsory heath insurance fall within the scope of the commerce power. Col-
lective action federalism provides a useful framework of analysis: the key federalism ques-
tion is whether individual action by states suffices to address this issue, or whether address-
ing it effectively requires collective action—for example, because of the likely movement of 
insurance companies, sick Americans, and healthy Americans to different state regimes. 
Another question currently in dispute is whether the “individual mandate” in the law 
qualifies as a tax or a regulation for constitutional purposes. Economic theories of federalism 
have a lot to say about taxes and regulations, including similarities and differences between 
them. A future article will extend our theory of collective action federalism to this timely 
issue. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 205. 
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